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Abstract
This paper analyzes the tax haven investment behavior of multinational firms from a
country that exempts foreign income from taxation. High foreign tax rates generally
encourage firms to invest in tax havens, though significant costs of reallocating taxable
income dampen these incentives. The behavior of German manufacturing firms from
2002-2008 is consistent with this prediction: at the mean, one percentage point higher
foreign tax rates are associated with three percentage point greater likelihoods of owning
tax haven affiliates. This contrasts with earlier evidence for U.S. firms subject to home
country taxation, which are more likely to invest in tax havens if they face lower foreign
tax rates. Foreign tax rates appear to be unrelated to tax haven investments of German
firms in service industries, possibly reflecting the difficulty they face in reallocating taxable
income.
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1. Introduction
Tax havens are typically small, well-governed states that impose low or zero tax rates
on foreign investors (Dharmapala and Hines, 2009). Multinational enterprises (MNEs) are
widely believed to use tax havens to avoid taxation. Sophisticated tax planning strategies
involving tax havens have received considerable attention in the media (e.g. Drucker,
2010), and tax havens have repeatedly been in the focus of national and international
policy measures. To name a few examples, the OECD launched the “Initiative on Harmful
Tax Competition” in 1998 to pressure tax havens to abolish harmful tax provisions and
practices. France announced plans to introduce a 50% tax on income earned by French
affiliates in tax havens in February 2010. Most recently, the U.S. House Committee on
Ways and Means held a background hearing on the transfer pricing practices of U.S.
taxpayers, with an emphasis on income reallocation to offshore tax havens.1
Despite considerable policy interest, the determinants of incentives to invest in tax
havens are not fully understood. This paper develops a simple theoretical model identify-
ing that high non-haven tax rates and low costs of profit reallocation generally encourage
tax haven investment by firms located in countries that exempt foreign income from tax-
ation. Evidence from the foreign activities of a panel of German multinationals from
2002-2008 is consistent with the implications of the model. Profits of foreign affiliates are
nearly tax-free under German law, so German MNEs face clear incentives with regard to
foreign taxation (IBFD, 2009).2
The analysis separately studies manufacturing and service companies in order to in-
vestigate how sectoral differences in the costs of establishing and using tax haven affiliates
affect tax haven investment incentives. In addition, the detailed affiliate-level panel data
set makes it possible to control for unobserved firm characteristics by using firm-fixed
effects. Thus, it is possible to capture unobserved firm-specific differences in the marginal
cost of profit shifting, for example. Such differences may appear due to differences in a
firm’s R&D intensity or its intangible assets, as these factors influence the ease of strate-
gically choosing transfer prices.
To gauge the impact of foreign taxation on tax haven investment, we estimate a linear
probability model of tax haven investment using the size of the MNEs’ domestic and
foreign activities as additional control variables. This empirical strategy accounts for the
fact that the tax rates a firm faces at its foreign locations may be endogenous to its
decision to invest in a tax haven. Holding a tax haven affiliate, an MNE may be more
likely to invest in countries that it would not invest in unless it could use tax haven
operations to reduce global tax burdens. We therefore follow Desai, Foley, and Hines
1The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation prepared a detailed report including six case studies
of the tax avoidance practices of large US firms (Joint Committee on Taxation, 2010).
2For a summary of the legal situation in Germany, see section 2.
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(2006) in using competitors’ average foreign non-haven tax rates as instruments for the
firm level foreign tax rates at non-haven locations.
The evidence indicates that the probability that a manufacturing firm invests in a tax
haven increases with the rate at wich its other foreign operations are taxed. This finding
is robust across specifications. Further, larger parent size, higher parent productivity and
larger size of foreign non-haven activities raise the probability of tax haven investment. In
contrast, neither parent variables nor foreign non-haven tax rates significantly influence
tax haven investment for firms in the service sector, after controlling for endogeneity due
to simultaneity or omitted firm-specific characteristics.
The difference between the tax haven investment patterns of manufacturing and ser-
vice firms is robust and is difficult to attribute either to the instrumentation strategy or
to potential selection bias of the regression sample of service firms towards larger entities.
The results suggest the following interpretation. Due to their lower variable costs of profit
reallocation, and possibly the greater variation in these costs between firms, manufactur-
ing firms respond more strongly to incentives from higher tax rates in their choice of tax
haven investment. Service firms’ tax haven investments may not vary significantly with
foreign taxation because of their higher marginal cost of profit reallocation, and relative
uniformity of profit reallocation costs among service firms. Nonetheless, service firms in-
vest in tax havens because their fixed cost of doing so is lower, which may stem both from
lower cost of setting up an affiliate and from profits which service firms earn from ordinary
business activities in tax haven countries. Using sector-level data on R&D intensities, we
offer further evidence that this difference may be driven by differences in (unobservable)
costs of reallocating taxable income.
This paper is related to two strands of the literature, the literature on tax haven use
by multinational enterprises and on profit reallocation in general.
Studies of the use of tax havens by multinational companies have been largely confined
to U.S. enterprises and thus to firms subject to a tax credit system; the literature also
does little to distinguish the activities of manufacturing and service firms. Income earned
by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms is subject to U.S. taxation when repatriated, foreign
branch income is taxed by the U.S. as earned, and U.S. firms are granted credits for taxes
paid at their foreign locations. Thus, U.S. multinationals have two different avoidance
motives for the use of tax havens: avoiding host country taxes and deferring U.S. taxation
of foreign income. By analyzing firms subject to a tax exemption system, it is possible
to identify the impact of tax rate differences without the added (U.S.) complication that
some firms use tax haven operations to facilitate deferral of home country taxes. We thus
use a sample of firms which face clear incentives with regard to foreign taxation, because
their international revenues will generally not be subject to German taxation, no matter
how high or low host country tax rates are.
Harris, Morck, Slemrod, and Yeung (1993) use a five-year panel on 200 large U.S.
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manufacturing firms and find that U.S. tax liabilities of U.S. firms holding affiliates in
Ireland or one of the four low tax “dragon” Asian countries are systematically lower
than those of U.S. firms without such activities. Hines and Rice (1994) analyze a cross-
section of country level data on the activities of U.S. multinational firms, finding that U.S.
multinationals report disproportionate shares of profits in tax havens, which suggests that
income may be reallocated for tax purposes. Grubert and Slemrod (1998) use a cross-
section of data and estimate a joint model of the investment and profit shifting decision
of U.S. multinationals in Puerto Rico which, due to its special status, can serve as a tax
haven for U.S. firms. They find that firms with intangible assets are more likely than
others to invest in Puerto Rico.
Desai et al. (2006), who are closest to our analysis, use an affiliate-level data set
on U.S. multinationals’ foreign activities in four years between 1982 and 1999. They
estimate a logit model of tax haven investment given parent characteristics and take into
account the endogeneity of the foreign non-haven tax rate due to simultaneity of a parent’s
location decisions. They find a negative effect of the average foreign non-haven tax rate
on the probability of investing in a tax haven, interpreting their finding as evidence of the
impact of incentives induced by the ability to defer home country taxation of unrepatriated
foreign profits. Thus, it is particularly interesting to compare the U.S. evidence with the
tax haven investment behavior of firms that are subject to a tax exemption regime, as
German firms are, which have clear incentives to use tax haven operations to reallocate
taxable income.
The literature on international profit shifting is vast, and for brevity, we will restrict
our review to a few recent examples for the different strands of the literature. That taxes
matter for profit shifting of international firms has been documented by Huizinga and
Laeven (2008), amongst others. They use a cross-section of European MNEs and find
evidence for substantial profit shifting between different countries in Europe, which fits
international profit shifting incentives that arise from tax differences both between the
parent and host country and among different affiliate locations. Weichenrieder (2009)
analyzes a panel data set of German inbound and outbound FDI and identifies empirical
patterns that are consistent with profit shifting in both cases.
With respect to different profit shifting strategies, Clausing (2001, 2003, 2006) provides
empirical evidence that taxes exert a substantial impact on transfer prices and intra-firm
trade flows of U.S. firms. Dischinger and Riedel (2011) offer evidence from a panel data
set of European firms that MNEs prefer locating intangible assets at low-tax locations,
arguably doing so because they are able to choose favorable transfer prices for intangible
assets. Karkinsky and Riedel (2009) report similar findings with respect to patent location
within MNEs. Egger, Eggert, Keuschnigg, and Winner (2010) compare the debt-to-asset
ratios of domestically and foreign owned European firms and identify a gap in the ratios
which is systematically related to corporate tax rates. Buettner, Overesch, Schreiber,
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and Wamser (2009) provide further evidence on tax-motivated choice of capital structure
using a panel data set of German MNEs. Using the same data, Buettner and Wamser
(2007) analyse the use of intrafirm-loans for profit shifting, but find that they have rather
small tax revenue effects. Weichenrieder and Mintz (2010) as well as Wamser (2008)
show, using data on German MNEs, that firms tactically locate their direct and indirect
affiliates and strategically use ownership chains in a way that facilitates tax avoidance.
The paper is structured as follows. First, we provide a brief overview of German
international tax law provisions. In the following section, we present our theoretical
model and derive the hypotheses for our empirical analysis. Section 4 describes the data
used in the analysis and provides descriptive statistics; section 5 outlines our empirical
approach. Section 6 summarizes our regression results, section 7 provides some robustness
checks and section 8 discusses the implications. The last section concludes.
2. German taxation of foreign income
Germany generally exempts foreign income from taxation: dividends from foreign
subsidiaries, and a German parent’s income earned in foreign branches, are virtually tax
exempt in Germany.
Affiliates, whether national or foreign, are treated as entities separate from the German
parent. Dividends distributed by national or foreign affiliates as well as capital gains are
tax free. Only 5% of dividends and capital gains are taxed as non-deductible operating
expenditures (§8b KStG (German corporate income tax code)). This is an important
difference with the U.S. tax system, since a U.S. tax is due when the parent company
receives dividends from foreign affiliates, and the parent company is entitled to claim an
indirect tax credit for income taxes paid by foreign affiliates.
On paper, German tax is due on the income earned in foreign branches independently
of repatriation, because the worldwide income of German companies is in principle subject
to German profit taxation (Hoehn and Hoering, 2010, IBFD, 2009). Companies are
granted a tax credit or a rebate for taxes paid abroad. There is no German tax if Germany
has a double taxation treaty with the host country, as Germany generally stipulates tax
exemption of foreign income in double taxation treaties (Hoehn and Hoering, 2010, p. 116).
Due to the tight network of double taxation treaties, income earned in foreign branches
is de facto exempt from taxation in Germany.
An exception to these general rules is the anti-avoidance provision of German tax
law (part of the German “Aussensteuergesetz (AStG)” commonly referred to as “CFC-
legislation”). The anti-deferral rules apply if a German parent controls an affiliate or
branch abroad which earns income from passive investment that accounts for more than
10% of total income and is taxed at a rate of less than 25%. In this case, the passive
income of the branch or affiliate is apportioned to the parent and subject to German tax
independent of repatriation (§§7-9 AStG).
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Passive income is defined in a negative way as income which is not active, that is,
income which is not generated through agriculture, production, trade, services, dividends,
disposal of shares, and, subject to further requirements, banking, insurance, renting or
leasing. Income from borrowing or lending is classified as active income if capital is raised
in foreign capital markets only and from unrelated parties and lent to active foreign
businesses or permanent establishments (§8 AStG). Until recent changes for the years
from 2011 onwards (draft Jahressteuergesetz 2010 (tax law for the year 2010)), these
rules did not apply if the nominal tax rate was higher than 25%, even if the effective tax
burden was much lower, as for example in Malta or Panama.
Since the judgement of the European Court of Justice in the Case of Cadbury Schweppes,
the provisions explicitly provide for the opportunity to demonstrate substantive activi-
ties if the affiliate is located in the EU or EEA, which include Ireland, Luxembourg and
Liechtenstein on the list of tax havens. The rules do not apply if the affiliate can be
demonstrated to participate in the host country markets, to employ qualified personnel
and generate its own income (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2007).
A number of recent research papers analyze the effect of the anti-avoidance regulation
and yield a nuanced picture on the effect of these provisions on profit shifting by multi-
national enterprises. On the one hand, Ruf and Weichenrieder (2009) report that the
CFC rules significantly reduced passive investment in low-tax jurisdictions. They take a
multinational’s location decisions as given and define passive income as the total financial
assets of an affiliate minus equity holdings in and lending to affiliated enterprises to avoid
double counting. Using the same set up and a regression discontinuity approach, Egger
and Wamser (2010) find that the CFC rules are also associated with less investment in
fixed assets around the threshold from non-applicability to applicability. On the other
hand, Overesch and Wamser (2010) provide evidence that the German CFC rules do not
affect internal lending of foreign affiliates in low-tax locations to other foreign subsidiaries.
They find that internal debt shares react positively to tax rate differentials between dif-
ferent locations and that CFC rules do not influence this relationship. Whether and how
these provisions affect profit shifting through other strategies such as transfer pricing has
not yet been explored.
Overall, this research suggests that the CFC provisions do not foreclose tax planning
by MNEs per se, but they render it cumbersome. MNEs can still strategically relocate
activities to low tax countries and tax havens, but they have to generate income from
active local investment and may not benefit from simply setting up a “letterbox company”.
The significance of this requirement is that using a tax haven may entail considerable
fixed costs, as MNEs must generate active income to benefit fully from their tax haven
investments.
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3. Incentives to establish tax haven operations
In this section we lay out a stylized theoretical framework to describe the incentives
of a multinational firm to invest in a tax haven and to derive the empirical predictions
to be tested later on. For this purpose, we study a multinational firm that can invest in
a range of countries i = 0, ..., n, including a tax haven, which is denoted as country 0.
Starting a foreign affiliate involves fixed set-up cost ci. Let ρi denote before-tax profits
earned in country i by the affiliate once it is installed. Reported profits are taxed at rate
τi in country i. Without loss of generality we assume that τ0 = 0, i.e. there is no taxation
in the tax haven.
Firms can reallocate an amount ψi of their actual profits in country i to a country
that taxes reported profits at a lower tax rate, most notably to the tax haven country,
for example by adjusting their transfer prices. This is possible only at some cost. Firms
may need to set up additional facilities to make transfer prices seem plausible, inefficient
relocation of production and intra-firm trade may be needed to arrange income reallo-
cation, and transaction costs are incurred, like legal expenses. We assume that income
reallocation gets increasingly expensive as the amount reallocated increases relative to
income earned in country i. Following Hines and Rice (1994), these income reallocation
costs are assumed to be (a/2)(ψi
2/ρi).
3 Parameter a captures how much the cost of in-
come reallocation increases with the amount reallocated. Note that a is a firm-specific
parameter because income reallocation costs vary with firm-specific characteristics such
as the R&D intensity of a firm. As indicated above, firms with more R&D activities and
larger intangible assets have been shown to be more easily able to reallocate income due to
the lack of comparable market prices. The reported profit in country i, pii, after incurring
fixed cost ci, is thus
pii = ρi − ψi − a
2
ψi
2
ρi
. (1)
Consider now the option of setting up an affiliate in a tax haven at cost c0. To
save on notation, we set ρ0 = 0 and let c0 capture the net cost of investing in a tax
haven, after deducting any profits that arise genuinely in this country. For c0 < 0, the
multinational has an interest in investing in a tax haven country, and does so, independent
of investments in other countries. This interest could arise from plans to reallocate income
from the home country, though since our data set contains information on parent firms
from only one home country, Germany, it is not possible to gauge the impact of this tax
incentive empirically. Thus, we focus on multinationals that invest in non-haven countries
as well.
3For simplicity, we assume that the cost of reallocating income to a tax haven and to another non-
haven country are equal. This assumption does not affect the main intuition of the model, but renders
notation far more tractable.
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In order to evaluate the incentive to invest in a tax haven, consider first the situation
of a multinational with a tax haven affiliate. The firm chooses in which other countries
to locate affiliates and how much of their profits to reallocate to the tax haven. Thus, the
investor’s maximization problem, given that it has a tax haven affiliate, is
max
di,ψi
n∑
i=1
di
[
ψi + (1− τi)(ρi − ψi − a
2
ψi
2
ρi
)− ci
]
(2)
with di ∈ {0, 1}, s.t.
ρi − ψi − a
2
ψi
2
ρi
≥ 0 ∀i = 1, ..., n . (3)
We assume first that this constraint is fulfilled and subsequently reconsider what happens
if this is not the case. The first order condition for ψi is thus
1− (1− τi)− (1− τi)aψi
ρi
= 0 (4)
which implies
ψ∗thi =
τiρi
a(1− τi) (5)
Inserting ψ∗thi into condition (3) produces a condition for a and τi that must be fulfilled
for 3 to hold.
ρi − τiρi
a(1− τi) −
τi
2ρi
2a(1− τi)2 ≥ 0 (6)
⇔ τi ≤ 1−
√
1
2a+ 1
(7)
Consider now values of τi and a such that the constraint (3) is not fulfilled for ψ
∗th
i as
determined by the first order condition. In this case, ψi is chosen such that condition (3)
is satisfied with equality, which yields
ψ¯i =
ρi
a
(√
2a+ 1− 1
)
(8)
In this case, there are no more positive profits reported by the affiliate in the non-haven
country and hence ψ¯i equals the multinational’s profit from investing in country i, re-
allocated to the tax haven, after incurring fixed cost ci. For ease of presentation, in
the following we restrict consideration to cases in which condition (3) holds, and discuss
deviations only when necessary for the results.
Let countries be numbered such that country i = 1 yields the highest after-tax profit,
including the fixed cost of setting up the affiliate, and country i = n yields the lowest
profit. Then the multinational chooses di = 1 for all countries i = 1, ..., n˜, where n˜ is
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determined by the condition
ψn˜+(1−τn˜)(ρn˜−ψn˜−a
2
ψ2n˜
ρn˜
)−cn˜ ≥ 0 > ψn˜+1+(1−τn˜+1)(ρn˜+1−ψn˜+1−a
2
ψ2n˜+1
ρn˜+1
)−cn˜+1 . (9)
Using ψ∗thi as determined by the first order condition for ψi, this condition simplifies
to
(1− τn˜)ρn˜ + τ
2
n˜ρn˜
2a(1− τn˜) − cn˜ ≥ 0 > (1− τn˜+1)ρn˜+1 +
τ 2n˜+1ρn˜+1
2a(1− τn˜+1) − cn˜+1 . (10)
Consider now the multinational’s situation if it has no tax haven affiliate. In this case,
profit-shifting has to be directed to the country charging the lowest tax rate among those
in which the multinational holds an affiliate.4 Let τ denote the minimum of all tax rates
charged in countries in which the multinational invests. Then the profit maximization
problem is the following
max
di,ψi
n∑
i=1
di
[
(1− τ)ψi + (1− τi)(ρi − ψi − a
2
ψi
2
ρi
)− ci
]
(11)
with di ∈ {0, 1}, subject to the same constraint (3) as above. The first order condition
yields
ψ∗nthi =
(τi − τ)ρi
a(1− τi) . (12)
Note that for the parameter condition on τi and a assumed above, this optimal ψ
∗nth
i
also satisfies constraint (3). The first order condition for di yields that the multinational
chooses di = 1 for all countries i = 1, ..., nˆ and di = 0 otherwise, where nˆ is determined
by the condition that
(1−τ)ψnˆ+(1−τnˆ)(ρnˆ−ψnˆ−a
2
ψ2nˆ
ρnˆ
)−cnˆ ≥ 0 > (1−τ)ψnˆ+1+(1−τnˆ+1)(ρnˆ+1−ψnˆ+1−a
2
ψ2nˆ+1
ρnˆ+1
)−cnˆ+1 .
(13)
Using ψ∗nthi as determined by the first order condition for ψi, this condition simplifies to
(1− τnˆ)ρnˆ + (τnˆ − τ)
2ρnˆ
2a(1− τnˆ) − cnˆ ≥ 0 > (1− τnˆ+1)ρnˆ+1 +
(τnˆ+1 − τ)2ρnˆ+1
2a(1− τnˆ+1) − cnˆ+1 . (14)
A comparison with (10) shows that n˜ ≥ nˆ, since the profits realized from each country are
potentially larger if it is possible to reduce taxes by reallocating income to a tax haven.
For the multinational, investing in a tax haven is worth the set up cost c0 if and only
4We assume for simplicity that the multinational shifts profits to one country only. Giving up this
assumption would yield computation far more complicated, but would not affect our results qualitatively.
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if
n˜∑
i=1
[
ψi + (1− τi)(ρi − ψi − a
2
ψi
2
ρi
)− ci
]
−c0 ≥
nˆ∑
i=1
[
(1− τ)ψi + (1− τi)(ρi − ψi − a
2
ψi
2
ρi
)− ci
]
(15)
Inserting the optimal ψ∗thi and ψ
∗nth
i and simplifying yields the following condition:
Incth =
nˆ∑
i=1
ρiτ(2τi − τ)
2a(1− τi) +
n˜∑
i=nˆ+1
[
(1− τi)ρi + τi
2ρi
2a(1− τi) − ci
]
− c0 ≥ 0, (16)
where Incth denotes the net benefit (“Incentive”) from investing in a tax haven. If this
net benefit is positive the multinational chooses to invest in a tax haven.
Consider first the case where c0 > 0. To determine the impact of tax rates we have to
distinguish the tax rates in countries in which the multinational is active independent of a
tax haven investment versus those that only become attractive with a tax haven. Simple
inspection of Incth yields the following comparative statics.
dIncth
dτi
=
ρiτ(2− τ)
2a(1− τi)2 > 0 ∀i = 1, ..., nˆ . (17)
Thus, the higher are the tax rates in countries in which the multinational would be active
without a tax haven investment, the more profitable it becomes to invest in a tax haven.
Furthermore,
d2Incth
dτidρi
=
τ(2− τ)
2a(1− τi)2 > 0 ∀i = 1, ..., nˆ . (18)
This shows that the effect of a foreign tax rate is sensitive to the profitability of the
respective affiliate, with higher profits increasing the effect of the foreign tax rate. In
addition,
d2Incth
dτida
= − ρiτ(2− τ)
2a2(1− τi)2 < 0 ∀i = 1, ..., nˆ . (19)
Thus, the more difficult profit-shifting is for the multinational, the less sensitive will be its
reaction to foreign tax rate changes. It is instructive to evaluate the effect of tax changes
in countries in which the multinational is active only in case of a tax haven investment.
dIncth
dτi
= −ρi + τi(2−τi)ρi2a(1−τi)2 < 0 ∀i = nˆ+ 1, ..., n˜ ∀τi ≤ 1−
√
1
2a+ 1
, (20)
dIncth
dτi
= 0 ∀i = nˆ+ 1, ..., n˜ ∀τi > 1−
√
1
2a+ 1
. (21)
This result has the notable implication that a multinational may in fact be tempted to
invest in a tax haven following a tax reduction in a country in which it has not been present
so far. This counterintuitive situation can arise if this tax reduction makes an investment
in this country attractive and hence adds to the potential base for profit shifting.
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Inspection of equation (16) further shows that firms in industries with lower fixed costs
of establishing tax haven affiliates are more likely than others to have haven affiliates. It
is noteworthy that the fixed cost c0 should be interpreted as the net cost of establishing
a tax haven affiliate to use for tax avoidance purposes: c0 is reduced to the extent that
firms can recoup some of their setup costs with profits from ordinary activity. If a tax
haven affiliate would be profitable in the course of ordinary business activity that does not
include any tax-motivated income reallocation, then c0 would be negative. In this case,
the multinational’s investment decision is driven not only by the profit shifting potential
from foreign affiliates, but also by profits which genuinely arise in the tax haven or by
profit shifting considerations concerning the parent company that are captured by c0.
Hence firms in industries in which tax haven operations can serve the dual function of
facilitating profit reallocation and generating ordinary business returns effectively face
lower costs of engaging in profit reallocation through havens, and are therefore likely to
do more of it.
We can summarize these results in the following empirical predictions. From equation
(17), it is clear that the larger the tax rate in a foreign non-haven country in which the
multinational holds an affiliate, the more likely it is that a multinational invests in a tax
haven. The second prediction is based on equation (19): the less costly it is to shift profits
to a tax haven country, the stronger is the influence of foreign taxation on a multinational
firm’s tax haven investment.
Average foreign tax rates and values of the shifting cost parameter are likely to differ
between firms, and may vary systematically between industries. Industries may differ in
average values of the shifting cost parameter a, reflecting differences in the importance
of intangible assets and other business features that facilitate profit reallocation; and
industries may also differ in the extent to which a varies among firms in the industry.
Differentiating (19) with respect to a indicates that:
d3Incth
dτid2a
=
ρiτ(2− τ)
a3(1− τi)2 > 0 (22)
Since the expression in (22) is positive, it follows that the effect of a on dInc
dτi
is nonlinear,
and more specifically, that a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of a produces a
greater average value of dInc
dτi
. Consequently, industries in which firms have very different
costs of profit reallocation should be expected to display greater average sensitivity of tax
haven demand to non-haven tax rates than do other industries, even though average costs
of profit reallocation do not differ.
When attempting to identify the effect of foreign tax rates on the tax haven decision
empirically, we need to take into account that the multinational is potentially engaged in
several countries and that therefore the tax rates of all these countries matter. As equation
(18) shows, they do so to a different extent, however, depending on the profitability of the
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individual affiliates. We capture this by investigating the impact of the average non-haven
tax rate, where all the foreign tax rates are weighted by the profitability of the individual
affiliate. If the multinational has not invested in a tax haven, this average foreign tax rate
is given by ∑nˆ
i=1 τiρi∑nˆ
i=1 ρi
. (23)
In our empirical analysis we encounter the difficulty that we are not able to observe
the actual profits ρi in country i, only reported after-tax profits (1−τi)pii. These reported
profits are distorted due to taxation and income reallocation. In case of a tax haven
investment they are given by
(1− τi)pii = (1− τi)(ρi − ψi − a
2
ψi
2
ρi
) = (1− τi)
[
1− τi(2− τi)
2a(1− τi)2
]
ρi . (24)
Inspection shows that this distortion is the higher the higher the country’s tax rate τi.
Thus, we require appropriate proxies to capture the effect of an affiliate’s profitability on
the decision to invest in a tax haven.
Furthermore, we need to account for the fact that the average foreign tax rate we
observe is potentially affected by the multinational’s decision to invest in a tax haven.
The tax haven investment may make it profitable to invest in foreign countries that would
not have been attractive destinations for investments without the income reallocation
opportunities created by the tax haven investment.
Consider a change in tax rates ∆i ≥ 0 in countries i = 1, ..., n˜ such that the investor
chooses to invest in a tax haven after this change in tax rates, but would not do so before.
Both an increase in the tax rates at locations i = 1, ..., nˆ where the multinational already
holds an affiliate and a decrease in the tax rates at locations i = nˆ+1, ..., n˜ which become
attractive only after tax haven investment could render tax haven investment optimal.
The average non-haven tax rate for the investor changes from the status quo to the new
average non-haven tax rate ∑n˜
i=1(τi + ∆i)ρi∑n˜
i=1 ρi
. (25)
The observed change in the non-haven average tax rate is thus∑n˜
i=1(τi + ∆i)ρi∑n˜
i=1 ρi
−
∑nˆ
i=1 τiρi∑nˆ
i=1 ρi
(26)
which can be rewritten as
∑nˆ
i=1 ∆iρi∑n˜
i=1 ρi
+
∑n˜
i=nˆ+1 ρi
(∑n˜
i=nˆ+1(τiρi+∆iρi)∑n˜
i=nˆ+1 ρi
−
∑nˆ
i=1 τiρi∑nˆ
i=1 ρi
)
∑n˜
i=1 ρi
. (27)
11
In our empirical analysis we are interested in identifying the effect of exogenous changes
in tax rates, captured by the first term. As we have seen above, investing in a tax
haven is positively influenced by an increase in the tax rates of the countries in which the
multinational already holds affiliates. Thus, when estimating the impact of foreign tax
rates, higher tax rates in countries in which a multinational firm would invest under any
circumstances should stimulate greater demand for tax haven affiliates.
The second term captures the change in the observed non-haven tax rate that is due
to endogeneity of the multinational’s investment decision. Evaluating the numerator of
the second term we find that the observed change in the average non-haven tax rate
exceeds the change of interest if the new affiliates the multinational opens due to the tax
haven investment are located in countries that exhibit on average higher tax rates than
the previous average tax rate, and conversely. This has important implications for the
interpretation of the causal effects of tax changes. In particular, OLS results overestimate
the true effects, as captured by the IV estimates, if the tax rates at the firm’s new locations
increase the firm’s average foreign non-haven tax rate, and underestimate the true effects
if the tax rates faced at the new locations are lower than the previous average foreign
non-haven tax rate. We discuss in section 4 how our empirical strategy accounts for this
potential endogeneity of the observed tax rate.
The second prediction cannot be tested directly with the available data, since it is
not possible to measure firm-specific income reallocation costs. Instead, we use firm-fixed
effects in the baseline econometric analysis to control for differences in marginal costs of
income reallocation and distinguish firms by industrial sectors in an attempt to proxy for
cost differences that vary with industry.
4. Data and descriptive statistics
Our analysis is based on the Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi) provided by
the Bundesbank, the German central bank. We use the information on outward foreign
direct investment by German companies. The database consists of a panel of yearly
information on the foreign affiliates of German firms for the period from 1996 until 2008.
By the German Foreign Trade and Payment Regulation (Aussenwirtschaftsverordnung),
any resident who holds shares or voting rights of at least 10% in a company with a
balance sheet total of more than 3 million euro is obliged to report information on the
financial characteristics of these affiliates to the Bundesbank (Lipponer, 2009).5 The same
information has to be provided on branches or permanent establishments abroad if their
operating assets exceed 3 million euro. The comprehensiveness of these data suggest that
they can be used to draw a very reliable picture of the foreign investment of German
5The reporting thresholds have changed several times in the past. We only refer to the reporting
threshold as of 2002 that is relevant to us.
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companies.
The MiDi data include information on parent companies only for the years 2002 to
2008, so the analysis is restricted to these years. During the 2002-2008 period, the MiDi
contains 173,312 affiliate-year observations. Some affiliates are reported several times,
because multiple investors hold participating interests in them. We focus our analysis on
directly held foreign affiliates and thus abstract from more complex incentive structures
that may exist in multi-level holding chains.6 This limits the analysis to 117,585 affiliate-
year observations.
For consistency across parents, we delete 218 observations for which the degree of
participation of the parent is smaller than the reporting requirement of 10%. In addition,
we drop observations on parents in a number of sectors, including government institutions
and private households. We drop observations on parents in the financial sector, because
they are subject to special balancing requirements, and the reporting requirements for
these companies changed during the period of analysis. We delete the sectors housing
enterprises and other real estate activities, as they report neither sales nor employees,
which we will use as size measure in our analysis. Similarly, we drop the sector “hold-
ing companies” as reported sales and employees are very often zero, even though these
companies are not small.7 We later remove this restriction as a robustness check and find
that our results are unaffected.
We finally obtain a sample of 54,367 affiliate-year observations that correspond to
19,165 parent-year observations. The observations are distributed evenly across years
with a minimum of 2,639 observations and a maximum of 2,875 observations.8
We augment the MiDi with information on statutory tax rates mainly from the In-
ternational Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) and information on GDP from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). We use the definition of tax havens derived by Hines
and Rice (1994) which is widely accepted in the literature and was only recently used by
Dharmapala and Hines (2009).9 Alternatively, we could have used the definition propa-
gated by the OECD (OECD, 2000). We chose Hines and Rice (1994)’s tax haven definition
to derive results which are comparable to the literature, in particular the study by Desai
et al. (2006). Further, no OECD member countries appear on the OECD’s tax haven list,
which thereby omits a number of tax havens popular with German firms, such as Switzer-
land. Very few investors in the MiDi data hold branches or affiliates in the island states
on the OECD tax haven list. Using the OECD’s tax haven definition would also preclude
using a linear probability model, because the model may not yield accurate coefficients
6For an in-depth discussion of the complex determinants of ownership chains, see Weichenrieder and
Mintz (2010).
7In addition, we delete 331 affiliate-year observations for parents which are not classified holdings, but
are de facto holdings after consultations with the statistical department of the Bundesbank.
8The distribution of observations across years is provided in Appendix C, Table C.7.
9For a list of tax havens, please refer to Appendix A.
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given the low incidence of investment in those tax havens (see also Durlauf, Navarro, and
Rivers (2010)).
Table 1 presents descriptive evidence on the use of tax havens by sectoral group. For
comparative purposes, information on financial firms is provided in addition to information
on firms in the manufacturing and service sector which are analyzed later on. On average,
a tax haven affiliate is held in 20.4% of parent-years (17.9% excluding financial companies).
This figure seems low by international standards: Desai et al. (2006) report that tax haven
investment is observed for 37.8% of parent-years in their sample of U.S. multinationals.
This difference reflects, in part, the inclusiveness of the German data, in that the size
thresholds for reporting are much lower than in the U.S. data analyzed by Desai et al.
(2006), resulting in a higher proportion of small firms and those with relatively small
foreign operations.10
The proportion of firms owning tax haven affiliates is higher for service firms (19.9%)
than for manufacturing firms (17.0%), and a larger proportion of service firms own a tax
haven affiliate but are not internationally active in non-haven countries. About a fifth
of both manufacturing and service firms that are present in tax havens own more than
one tax haven affiliate, and the mean number of tax haven affiliates is also approximately
equal. In contrast, 37.2% of financial firms hold affiliates in tax havens, and they own on
average twice as many tax haven affiliates as do manufacturing and service firms.
The share of affiliates in tax havens that are in the service sector is disproportionately
high. For manufacturing firms, the share of service affiliates in tax havens is about 17
percentage points higher than their overall share of affiliates in the service sector, and for
service firms, it is eight percentage points higher. Also for financial companies, investment
in service affiliates is more common in tax havens than in non-haven countries.
The lower panel of Table 1 reports the number of affiliate-year and parent-year obser-
vations by tax haven and sectoral group of the parent firm. It shows that the preferred
tax haven destination varies by sectoral group. Manufacturing firms clearly prefer the big
tax havens. More than 90% of observations are accumulated there; about 48% in Switzer-
land alone. The island tax havens, in particular Bermuda, the Cayman Islands and the
Channel Islands, are very rare investment destinations. Switzerland is similarly popular
among service firms; about half of their tax haven affiliates are located there. Service
firms more extensively use the small havens, where almost a fifth of tax haven affiliates
are located, most prominently 9% in Luxembourg. For financial companies, Luxembourg
is distinctly the most popular destination with 38% of affiliate-year observations in tax
10Desai et al. (2006) do not report the mean number of affiliates per parent. Their summary statistics
are based on 81,604 affiliate-years and their regressions use 8,435 parent-years, so crude calculations
imply a mean of 9.7 affiliates per parent. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004) use the same data set and report
that U.S. parents own between 7.5 and 7.8 affiliates on average in the years 1982, 1989 and 1994. In
contrast, parents in our sample average only 2.8 foreign affiliates (4.0 affiliates if indirectly held affiliates
are included).
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havens. The Cayman Islands are their fourth most important tax haven destination: 10%
of affiliate-year observations in tax havens are located there. Evidently, the attractiveness
of tax havens strongly depends on sector characteristics.
Table 2 provides an overview of the main variables used in our regression analysis for
the full sample and the two subgroups we are going to consider. The variables will be
explained in detail in the next section. The proportion of firms investing in a tax haven is
lower (around 14%) than for the full data and equal across sectoral groups, because firms
only investing in a tax haven drop from the regression sample. As firms with zero sales
or employees drop, the average size of the firms used in our regressions is slightly higher
than the average size of all firms in the sample. The statistics of the average foreign
non-haven tax rate and the instruments for the regression sample are similar.11 The
third columns for every group report mean difference tests of the main regressors by the
dependent variable. Firms that invest in a tax haven are on average significantly larger,
both domestically and internationally. Manufacturing firms are also significantly more
productive, as measured by the ratio of sales to employees. Furthermore, firms investing
in tax havens face significantly higher average foreign tax rates, which is consistent with
the incentives discussed earlier.
114.1% of manufacturing firms and 8.6% of service firms drop because only investment in tax havens is
observed. 4.0% of the remaining manufacturing firms and 18.0% of service firms drop due to their zero
number of employees. Table C.8 in Appendix C presents the corresponding summary statistics for the
full data.
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Table 1: Choice of tax havens, by sectoral group
Parent sector Manufacturing Service Financial
Total number of parent years 11,603 6,733 2,506
of which with tax haven affiliate 1,976 1,337 932
of which
internationally active parents 75.81% 52.43% 57.19%
with more than one t.h. affiliate 22.87% 18.03%
non tax non tax non tax
haven haven haven haven haven haven
Number of affiliate years 33,203 2,829 14,427 1,768 7,897 2,294
of which
in manufacturing sector 51.19% 32.63% 12.08% 4.81% 3.89% 0.74%
in service sector 46.69% 63.56% 82.20% 90.16% 15.35% 18.09%
in financial sector 1.38% 3.39% 4.76% 4.58% 79.84% 81.17%
other 0.75% 0.42% 0.96% 0.45% 0.92% –
Mean number of affiliates per parent 3.77 1.43 4.07 1.32 3.75 2.46
Choice of haven Manufacturing Service Financial
aff. par. aff. par. aff. par.
years years years years years years
Big havens: more than 1 million inhabitants
Hong Kong 459 410 233 219 164 104
Ireland 226 215 78 61 252 188
Lebanon 12 12 . . 8 8
Liberia . . 16 16 . .
Panama 19 19 20 20 3 3
Singapore 517 467 204 185 203 127
Switzerland 1,368 1,242 880 814 359 312
Small havens: less than 1 million inhabitants
Bermuda . . 13 13 23 19
British Virgin Islands 21 17 11 11 22 20
Cayman Islands . . 3 3 233 127
Cyprus 22 22 60 17 8 8
Channel Islands . . 19 19 89 28
Luxembourg 124 114 163 151 864 587
Malta 38 38 39 30 16 10
Other 23 21 29 27 50 32
Total 2,829 2,577 1,768 1,586 2,294 1,573
. denotes tax havens where fewer than three affiliate-years or parent-years are observed, so the exact number of
investments must not be reported for confidentiality reasons.
Manufacturing firms: firms classified NACE 1500-3700, service firms: firms classified NACE 5000-9300, with the before
mentioned sample restrictions, financial firms: firms classified NACE 6500-7000.
If a parent invests in several tax havens, it is counted multiple times (once per tax haven).
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5. Empirical Approach
As outlined in section 3, a multinational firm’s decision to invest in a tax haven
depends on the taxation it faces at its foreign non-haven locations, its marginal cost of
reallocating taxable income and the fixed cost of tax haven investment. The probability
of tax haven investment should increase as foreign non-haven tax rates rise, with this
effect being strongest for firms with low costs of reallocating profits.
We specify the following linear probability model:
yjt = β0 + β1τjt + β2pjt + β3p
2
jt + β4nhjt + β5nh
2
jt + γt + ujt (28)
The dependent variable yjt is a dummy which is equal to one if a firm j holds at least
one affiliate in at least one tax haven in a year t. Our independent variables are τjt, the
average of the statutory tax rates faced by j’s non-haven affiliates in t weighted by host
country GDP, pjt, the natural log of the size of company j in period t and its square,
p2jt, nhjt, the natural log of the size of j’s foreign non-haven activities in t and its square,
nh2jt, and γt, a year fixed effect.
The coefficient of main interest is β1. It captures the effect of the taxes levied on
profits of a multinational’s foreign non-haven affiliates on the probability that it invests
in a tax haven. Equation (18) implies that greater firm profitability increases the impact
of non-haven tax rates on the likelihood of investing in a tax haven affiliate. Thus, we
use a weighted, not a simple average of the foreign non-haven tax rates. We cannot use
before-tax profits as weights, as our data contain only after-tax profits which are doubly
distorted due to taxation and profit reallocation, so we use host country GDP instead.
Profits should increase with host country market size, so weighting the foreign non-haven
tax rates with GDP enables us to exogenously approximate their relative importance for
a multinational.12 As indicated above, we expect β1 > 0.
In principle, the probability of tax haven investment is also influenced by taxation in
the multinational’s home country. As we use a panel data set of German multinational
firms, this effect cannot be gauged explicitly due to lack of sufficient variation. Still,
changes in home country taxation are indirectly taken into account through the year
fixed effect.
12Earlier studies indicate that GDP correlates very closely with foreign investment and foreign prof-
itability, both in an aggregate cross section (e.g. Hines and Rice, 1994) and in a firm-level panel (e.g.
Desai et al., 2006). As an alternative to GDP weights, we considered using firm-level weights, such as
assets, sales or the number of employees. None of these measures is similarly satisfactory however. We
observe only fixed and intangible assets, not fixed assets separately, so this variable is very likely influ-
enced by tax-avoidance behavior. As pointed out below, a similar concern can be raised against the use
of sales. Concerning the number of employees, high taxes will be systematically underweighted and low
taxes overweighted if taxation affects the intensive margin of firm decisions. Nonetheless, we checked the
correlation of our tax measure and the measures resulting from other weighting schemes, and we found
that our measure is very highly and significantly correlated with them, see Appendix C, Table C.9.
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Other independent variables include parent size and the size of the parent’s non-haven
activities, capturing the impact of size on profitability. Recent literature on foreign direct
investment suggests that larger firms with bigger international activities can be expected
to be more productive than their smaller competitors (Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004,
Tomiura, 2007, Yeaple, 2009, Chen and Moore, 2010, e.g.). Consequently, these firms are
better able to overcome the fixed and variable costs associated with setting up an affiliate
in a tax haven and its subsequent use for income reallocation.
We use numbers of employees to measure parent size and the size of the company’s
foreign non-haven activities, reduced according to the share of participation interests
where applicable. The advantage of this size measure is that it is less likely to be affected
by profit reallocation activities than are alternatives such as sales. For example, foreign
affiliates may be permitted to use the distribution network of the parent company in
exchange for a small fee to sell their products directly to customers, so sales and profits
accrue abroad.13 As the distribution of the size variables is strongly skewed to the right,
the regressions use the natural log of sales as a size measure. Thus, observations for which
the size variables are zero drop from our regression sample. Following Desai et al. (2006),
regressions include the size measures both linearly and squared.
The variable cost of using a tax haven should vary with firm-specific characteristics
such as the R&D intensity of a firm. The location of intangible assets, licence arrange-
ments and royalty payments have been shown to be used as income reallocation tools (e.g.
Dischinger and Riedel, 2011, Karkinsky and Riedel, 2009).14 A firm with larger intan-
gible assets should have greater discretion in choosing transfer prices due to the lack of
comparable market transactions. Thus, and as also shown in equation (19), the response
to changes in foreign taxation should vary across firms depending on their marginal cost
of income reallocation. These firm specific characteristics are, however, unobservable.
We take two measures to address this issue. On the one hand, we conduct our analysis
separately for the group of manufacturing firms (NACE 1500-3700) and for the group of
service firms (NACE 5000-9300, with the before mentioned sample restrictions),15 because
the latter have a systematically smaller R&D intensity than the former. Using sector-level
data from the Innovation Survey of the Center for European Economic Research (Zentrum
fu¨r Europa¨ische Wirtschaftsforschung, ZEW) for the years 1996-2008, we find that the
average R&D intensity for the manufacturing sector is twice as high as the R&D intensity
13For an illustrative example, see the case study “Alpha Company” in the report prepared by the Joint
Committee on Taxation for the public background hearing by the House Committee on Ways and Means
in July 2010 (Joint Committee on Taxation, 2010).
14In addition, a variant of this type of strategy is part of all six case studies of the report by the Joint
Committee on Taxation prepared for the public hearing before the House Committee on Ways and Means
(Joint Committee on Taxation, 2010).
15This implies that we do not consider parent firms in agriculture, mining, electricity and water supply,
and construction in our analysis.
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for service sectors. At the same time, the descriptive evidence provided in section 4 shows
that the proportion of service firms owning tax haven affiliates and the share of service
firms’ affiliate-years observed in tax havens are higher than the corresponding statistics
for manufacturing firms. This could point to lower fixed costs of tax haven investment for
service firms. In addition, the share of service affiliates of manufacturing parents located
in tax havens is disproportionately higher than the share located in non-haven countries.
Overall, there is thus reason to believe that the processes governing tax haven investment
by service firms and by manufacturing firms may differ significantly, which suggests that
they should be analyzed separately.
The empirical analysis uses firm-fixed effects to capture the influence of firm-specific
differences in the marginal cost of income reallocation, at least to the extent that they are
approximately constant over the sample period. Fixed effects also account for unobserved
firm-specific characteristics such as the degree of tax sensitivity, that is, the importance
that a firm assigns to the amount of its tax payments, which may render firms ex ante
more or less likely to invest in tax havens.16 Likewise, the data provide information
on the sector of the affiliates mostly at the two-digit NACE Rev. 1 level, so particular
incentive schemes for firms in sub-sectors cannot be taken into account, and we do not
have information on the sub-national location of firms, so we cannot account for local
taxation. The use of firm-fixed effects controls for time-invariant aspects of these firm
attributes.
In estimating equation (28), it is necessary to take into account that the average foreign
non-haven tax rate is endogenous because entry in a tax haven has a feedback effect on the
optimal profit shifting and location decisions of a firm. To address this issue, we follow one
of the methods used by Desai et al. (2006), and instrument the parent’s foreign non-haven
tax rate with the competitors’ average foreign non-haven tax rate. The competitors are
defined as the other firms in the same sector. Firms in the same sector react to similar
incentives in choosing their investment destinations because similar location factors are
beneficial for them. At the same time, the competitors’ investment decision is exogenous
to whether a certain firm in the sector invests in a tax haven.17
A potential concern which could be raised against our instrumentation strategy is that
the propensity of a firm to invest in a tax haven could be affected by the prevalence of
tax haven investment in its sector. One could suspect that a firm’s tax haven investment
decision is directly affected by the choices of other firms in the same sector. Alternatively,
it is possible that the tax haven investment by firms in the same sector is correlated
because entry in a tax haven of some firms exerts competitive pressure on the remaining
firms in the sector to follow suit. In short, one could query whether endogenous and
16This issue has already been raised, but not addressed in Desai et al. (2006, p. 514).
17Note that this instrumentation strategy implies that we cannot use sector dummies in our analysis.
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correlated group effects as discussed by Manski (1993) are present. Yet, as highlighted by
Manski (1993), the existence and detection of group effects presupposes that the reference
group relevant to an individual is correctly specified and that the group mean behavior
can be correctly perceived by the individual group members. Given these prerequisites,
this source of endogenous or correlated group effects seems unlikely to exert a significant
effect on the estimates.
Firms usually offer multiple products and are active in various national and foreign
markets. Their choice of products and markets determines their competitors and thus the
reference groups for their decisions. Our data only contain German multinational firms.
The sector classification is the NACE two digit sector code assigned to the firm by the
statistical department of the Bundesbank based on a description of the main activity of
a firm. It is coarse and the resulting firm groups are sizeable.18
For some endogenous effect to exist, a firm would have to be able to observe the other
firms’ mean tax haven investment and activities. There is no evident way how firms
could obtain this information. One potential channel for tax haven investment to spread
might be that firms consult the same tax advisory company. Tax consultancies are not
specialized with respect to certain sectors however, and immediate competitors can be
expected to take care to choose different tax advisory companies. Suggestive evidence
for this conjecture can be found in Asker and Ljungqvist (2010) who study the choice of
investment banks and M&A advisors.
With regard to correlation due to competitive pressure, one could argue that firms
are forced to invest in tax havens by similar mechanisms as they may be coerced to
adopt a technological innovation: competitors could be able to offer higher returns on
investment to investors or could entice clients away as they are able to charge lower prices
due to savings through their tax haven activities. Tax haven investment and technological
innovation are only seemingly parallel, however. Investors will not compare firms within
the same sector, but investment options across all firms. Further, firms will usually spread
that they have succeeded to innovate, but, for sake of reputation, are unlikely to announce
that they have opened a tax haven affiliate and intend to reallocate taxable income there.
Finally, there is also the possibility that firms in similar industries are influenced by
correlated omitted variables that influence the location of all of their foreign investments,
including tax havens and non-havens. It is difficult to rule out this possibility, though
its implication is likely to be that estimated tax effects are biased in the direction of
low non-haven tax rates increasing the likelihood of tax haven investment. Tax havens,
after all, are low-tax locations. If firms in a given industry are prone to invest in low-tax
jurisdictions, with little or no causal interaction among these investment decisions, then
the regression estimates are apt to show that low non-haven tax rates are correlated with
18For an overview of the size of sectoral groups and their scope, please refer to Appendix C, Table C.10.
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tax haven investments. Since the estimated effects come out the opposite of this, there
may be reason to expect that the impact of correlated omitted variables is not particularly
strong. Further evidence suggesting that correlated omitted variables do not excessively
bias the estimates comes from the panel-based estimation that removes the impact of firm
fixed effects and nevertheless produces results that are similar to those reported for the
cross-section.
In sum, we estimate our regression equation in four different ways:
- pooled linear probability model,
- pooled linear instrumental variables model,
- linear fixed effects model,
- linear fixed effects model with instrumental variables.
The linear fixed effects model with instrumental variables is our preferred specification
because it takes all sources of endogeneity into account. Nevertheless, we report the
results of all four specifications, because they offer evidence of the factors that drive a
firm’s decision to invest in a tax haven beyond that available from only the fixed effects
IV regression. By comparing pooled and instrumental variables estimates, it is possible
to assess the bias due to endogeneity of the foreign location decisions. Juxtaposing the
results of pooled and fixed effects specifications facilitates a balanced assessment of the
influence of taxation, abstracting from unobservable differences in costs of using tax haven
operations.
We use a linear probability model because otherwise it would be difficult to address the
endogeneity issues satisfactorily in a limited dependent variables framework.19 Using logit
or probit would yield more accurate marginal effects at different points of the distribution
of the covariates. In the logit framework, using firm fixed effects would be possible, but
it is more problematic to use instruments.20 In the probit framework, we could conduct
an instrumental variables analysis (though under very strong distributional assumptions),
but would not be able to use firm fixed effects.
We generally use standard errors clustered at the level of the parent. For the fixed
effects instrumental variables regression, we use bootstrapped standard errors, as clustered
standard errors cannot be estimated. As recommended by Efron and Tibshirani (1998),
the bootstrap estimates are based on 200 replications.
19As far as possible, we have replicated our results using logit, probit, fixed effects logit and IV probit,
see section 7.1 below.
20Purely practically, one could construct an IV variant of fixed effects logit by plugging in the predicted
values from an OLS first stage regression in place of the endogenous variable and run a fixed effects logit
second stage regression. We refrain from doing so because this approach may not produce consistent
estimates, as conditional expectations do not pass through non-linear functions (see Wooldridge (2002,
p. 235-237) and Angrist and Pischke (2009, p. 190-192)).
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Table 3: Regression results
Manufacturing firms Service firms
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
OLS 2SLS FE FE IV OLS 2SLS FE FE IV
Ave. foreign 0.007∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.039∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.029 -0.000 -0.046
n.h. tax rate (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.023) (0.001) (0.021) (0.001) (0.165)
Parent size -0.064∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗ -0.013 -0.008 0.024 0.023 -0.002 0.007
(0.021) (0.021) (0.025) (0.030) (0.016) (0.017) (0.013) (0.053)
Parent size, 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.003 0.002 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.001
squared (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
Foreign non- -0.051∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ -0.036 -0.063∗∗∗ -0.046 -0.037∗ -0.051
haven size (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.024) (0.024) (0.029) (0.020) (0.051)
Foreign n.h. size, 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.006∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.011
squared (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010)
Constant -0.006 -0.597∗∗∗ 0.051 -0.995 -0.160∗∗ -0.742 0.119∗∗ 1.357
(0.060) (0.212) (0.068) (0.684) (0.069) (0.604) (0.055) (4.443)
# of observations 10661 10661 10661 10661 5052 5047 5052 5047
# of parents 2320 2320 2320 2320 1270 1269 1270 1269
R-squared 0.17 0.09 0.01 – 0.11 – 0.02 –
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Instrument N Y N Y N Y N Y
F-Statistics – 40.95∗∗∗ – 6.53∗∗ – 5.76∗∗ – 3.36∗
Standard errors Cluster Cluster Cluster Bootstrap Cluster Cluster Cluster Bootstrap
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the
parent firm or bootstrapped with 200 replications.
Note: the coefficients of foreign non-haven size in column 4 are significant at 12.5% (linear term) and 5.3% (squared
term). The F-statistic for the instrument is significant at 1.07%. In column 6, the coefficient of linear non-haven size
has a P-value of 10.7%.
Regression sample: column 1-4 manufacturing firms, i.e. firms classified NACE 1500-3700; column 5-8 service firms,
i.e. firms classified NACE 500-9300, except NACE 65xx, 70xx, 7490, 75xx, 95xx. Dependent variable: dummy variable
which denotes whether a parent owns at least one affiliate in at least one tax haven in a given year. Independent
variables: see Table 2.
6. Results
Table 3 presents the regression results. The first four columns in the table present
results for the sample of manufacturing firms and columns 5-8 present results for the
sample of service firms. The odd-numbered columns present the results if no instrument
is used, and the even-numbered columns contain the IV estimates.
For the sample of manufacturing firms, the F-test for exclusion of the instrument in
the first stage regression is rejected at high significance levels in all cases. The value of the
F-statistic is smaller than ten in the fixed effects IV setting, that is, below the threshold
recommended by Staiger and Stock (1997) commonly referred to in the literature. Note,
however, that the F-statistic is examined to prevent bias due to weak instruments, which is
proportional to the degree of overidentification. Our model is just identified and therefore
median-unbiased. The value of the F-statistic is thus less of a concern in our case (Angrist
and Krueger, 2001, Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
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The average foreign non-haven tax rate is estimated to have a significantly positive
effect on the probability of a manufacturing firm’s investing in a tax haven through-
out regressions. The coefficient in the 2SLS regressions is about four times higher, and
significantly so, than the coefficient in the pooled OLS regression, which does not take
the endogeneity of the average foreign non-haven tax rate into account. Likewise, the
coefficient in the fixed effects IV specification is higher than in the simple fixed effects
regressions. This suggests that the true effect of the average foreign non-haven tax rate
is underestimated if its endogeneity due to simultaneity is not taken into account. As
explained in section 3, this finding indicates that multinationals expand their activities
in a way such that their average foreign non-haven tax rate decreases following tax haven
investment. Given that some of the largest and most popular investment destinations
of German firms, such as the United States or France, also have the highest statutory
tax rates, this is consistent with multinationals’ investing in more sizeable and profitable
markets first.
Greater domestic and foreign activities are associated with higher likelihood of tax
haven investment, and the estimated coefficients on the size variables are largely unaffected
by the use of the instruments. The effect of parent size turns insignificant in specifications
that include fixed effects.
As the regression results in the columns 5-8 of Table 3 show, the estimated effect of the
average foreign non-haven tax rate on tax haven investment by service firms varies with
the estimation approach. It is positive and significant in the pooled OLS specification;
larger, but only with P-values of 16.9% when estimated with 2SLS, though the point
estimates of the tax coefficients in the regressions for service firms in columns 5 and 6
are almost identical to the point estimates of the tax coefficients in the corresponding
regressions for manufacturing firms presented in columns 1 and 2. The tax coefficients in
the fixed effects regressions for service firms reported in columns 7 and 8 are statistically
zero.
The probability of tax haven investment by service firms is generally unaffected by the
size of the parent company. Levels of foreign activity outside of tax havens are estimated
to have nonlinear, and, except in the regressions reported in column 8, significant effects
on tax haven operations, similar to the effects found for manufacturing firms.
None of our covariates is significant in the fixed effects instrumental variables regres-
sions. The low level of significance of the F-statistics for the instrument indicates that our
instrument is not strong enough to draw valid inferences. This is also reflected in the con-
stant being larger than one even though none of the other covariates is estimated to have
a significant effect. Our result does not stem from the within variation of the tax variables
being too low for service firms to identify a tax effect. The within standard deviation is
2.42 for the service firms compared to 2.27 for manufacturing firms. The insignificance of
the tax rate thus suggests that omitted variables play a comparatively larger role in tax
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haven investment decisions of service firms than they do for manufacturing firms.
Our preferred estimates come from the fixed effects IV specification. They show that
manufacturing firms are more likely to invest in tax havens if they face higher tax rates
in their foreign non-haven locations, even if unobservable differences in the cost of income
reallocation are taken into account. In contrast, we do not find a clear tax effect for service
firms in our preferred framework. This difference may reflect a combination of factors:
that service firms have higher costs of reallocating profits, or exhibit lower variability in
these costs. Manufacturing firms may rely to a greater average extent than service firms on
the returns to intangible property, the location of which may be more readily reallocated
for tax purposes than are other forms of income, but the distribution of which is highly
skewed, with some manufacturing firms earning significant fractions of their profits from
intangible property, and others very little. These factors would imply that foreign non-
haven tax rates should affect tax haven demand by manufacturing firms more heavily than
service firms, even though service firms are at least as likely as manufacturing firms to
establish tax haven operations in the first place. The 2SLS estimates appear to pick up the
effect of omitted differences in the costs of income reallocation. A further indication in this
direction is that the sector-level R&D intensities that are used in subsequent regressions
to proxy for the costs of reallocating taxable income in section 7.3 are positively correlated
with average foreign non-haven tax rates.
A further interesting finding is that parent size is a significant determinant of tax
haven use by manufacturing firms only. Together with the relatively higher prevalence of
tax haven investment by service firms described in section 4, this evidence is in accord
with a much lower fixed cost of tax haven investment by service firms. As outlined above,
the German anti-deferral provisions imply that a multinational does not only need to
formally establish a company in a tax haven (often referred to as “letterbox company”),
but has to locate some productive activity there. Our evidence suggests that this could
be more costly on net for manufacturing than for service firms.
7. Robustness checks
The following two subsections present estimated coefficients from specifications that
modify the basic econometric framework; from this evidence it appears that the results
reported in section 6 are largely robust. The estimates in subsection 7.3 attempt to
shed light on the firm characteristics captured by the firm fixed effects. Subsections 7.4
and 7.5 explicitly address three purely econometric interpretations of the results. The
first of these is that a firm investing in a tax haven may find it attractive to invest at
further non-haven locations to broaden the base of profits. Thus, not only the average
foreign non-haven tax rate, but also non-haven size may be endogenous. Second, the
F-test for exclusion of the instrument in the fixed effects instrumental variables regression
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for service firms is rejected only at the 10% level, so we may face bias due to weakness
of the instrument. Third, the regression sample of service firms could be non-randomly
selected and biased towards larger firms, because 18.0 percent of available observations
on service firms drop as the observed size measure is zero.21 In contrast, only 5 percent
of observations on manufacturing firms with non-haven investment drop for this reason.
On closer inspection, none of these issues appears to explain our results.
7.1. Simple modifications of baseline specification
To test whether our results are driven by the specific setup of our baseline econometric
analysis, we explore a number of variations, none of which substantially affects our main
findings. The results of these robustness checks are tabled in Appendix C.
First, we re-estimate the linear probability model using sales as size measure. For the
sample of manufacturing firms, the sign pattern of the coefficients is unaffected. Merely
parent size turns insignificant in all specifications. This is noteworthy given the above
mentioned possibility to use sales for profit shifting, Germany’s high tax rate and the
resulting potential for tax haven operations to be used to reallocate profits out of Germany
and into a tax haven, particularly by large firms with more taxes to save. The main
difference for service firms is that the tax variable becomes significant at the 10% level in
the 2SLS specification. It remains insignificant in the fixed effects specifications, though
there is still evidence of weakness of the instrument in the fixed effects instrumental
variables regression. Overall, this finding is in accord with our interpretation that the
fixed cost of tax haven investment and the marginal cost of profit shifting are more
important determinants of tax haven investment by service firms than by manufacturing
firms (see Tables C.15 and C.16 in Appendix C).
In addition, we re-estimate our model with employees as the size measure, but replace
the parent size variables with a simple estimate of parent productivity, the natural log
of parent sales over parent employees, as used by Helpman et al. (2004). We cannot use
a more sophisticated productivity estimate, as sector, number of employees, sales and
balance sheet total are the only parent company information in the data. We conduct
this regression both for the full period and for the years 2004-2008 only, because parent
sales and employees were both surveyed compulsorily only from 2004 on. For earlier
years, in case of missing values, one item may have been estimated based on the other,
so using both variables in the same regression would not be appropriate. Our results are
largely robust to this modification (see Tables C.11-C.14 in Appendix C). In particular,
the average foreign non-haven tax rate is still insignificantly negative in the fixed effects
IV specifications for service firms, but the F-statistic is highly significant, so this finding
21Overall, only 75 percent of service firms are used in the regression. 8.6 percent of firms drop because
they only invest in a tax haven. The proportion reported above is calculated relative to the sample of
firms for which non-haven investment is observed.
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is not clearly attributable to some weakness of the instrumental variable in this case.
Further, we re-estimate our baseline equation using limited dependent variable models
as far as possible: probit, logit, IV probit and fixed effects logit. The IV probit model
rests on the assumption that the endogenous variable is normally distributed conditional
on the instrument and parameters are only consistent if the error term is homoskedastic.
As it is uncertain whether these assumptions are valid in our case, the results have to
be interpreted with caution. The findings for manufacturing firms largely confirm our
previous results. Similarly to before, the tax variable is significant at the 10% level in the
IV probit regression for service firms, but insignificant in the fixed effects logit framework
(see Tables C.17 and C.18 in Appendix C).
Next, we re-include the sector “holding companies” in our analysis. We dropped this
sector before because holding companies usually report zero sales and employees even
though the actual companies are not small, and as the sector comprises firms with the
same administrative structure, but activities that actually belong to various other sectors.
To address the diversity of the sector, we assign parents the sector of the corporate group,
using a variable specifically created to address this issue in our data set. After dropping
financial companies, government institutions and private households, we obtain a sample
of 21,104 parent-year observations in the manufacturing sector and 13,059 parent-year
observations in the service sector.22 Our findings both for manufacturing firms and for
service firms are robust. Note in particular that again the average foreign non-haven tax
rate is estimated to have an insignificantly negative effect on the probability that a service
firm invests in a tax haven in the fixed effects IV specification, but the F-statistic indicates
sufficient strength of the instrument (see also Tables C.19 and C.20 in Appendix C).
7.2. Sensitivity to choice of tax havens and tax rates
The descriptive statistics in section 4 show that Switzerland is by far the most impor-
tant tax haven for German firms. This is not surprising given its geographical, linguistic
and cultural proximity to Germany. It is nonetheless potentially worrisome that the
findings could be driven by the dominance of this single tax haven, but as it happens,
the results are robust to dropping all affiliates located in Switzerland (see Tables C.21
and C.22 in Appendix C).
The main analysis uses statutory corporate tax rates to capture incentives for income
reallocation and thus tax haven use. This may not correctly capture tax differences be-
cause profits may not be taxed in full at this rate. To address this concern, we alternatively
use the effective tax rates collected by Djankov, Ganser, McLiesh, Ramalho, and Shleifer
(2010). As these data are available for the year 2004 only, we can only test the robustness
22Note that only two thirds of observations on manufacturing firms and only half of observations on
service firms are usable in our regressions because the reported number of employees is zero.
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of the pooled specifications. We obtain coefficients of the same sign and significance and
similar magnitude as before (see Table C.23 in Appendix C).
7.3. Sector-level R&D intensities as proxy for the marginal cost of profit shifting
A firm’s R&D intensity is a factor that is particularly likely to influence the marginal
cost of income reallocation. We use firm-fixed effects in our main econometric analysis to
capture firm-specific differences in the marginal costs of income reallocation, because we
do not have a firm level measure of R&D activities.
In order to shed light on the question of the extent to which the marginal costs of
income reallocation play a role for tax haven investment, we use sectoral data on R&D
intensity, which are provided by the Center for European Economic Research (Zentrum
fu¨r Europa¨ische Wirtschaftsforschung, ZEW) based on its annual Innovation Survey. We
include the sectoral R&D intensities in our pooled regressions. We refrain from doing so
in the regressions with firm fixed effects because the firm fixed effects capture firm level
heterogeneity with regard to the R&D intensity, so the firm fixed effects and the sectoral
R&D data are collinear.23
We cluster the standard errors on sector level and drop firms assigned to different
sectors in different years to avoid artificial variation.24 Our findings are presented in
Table 4.
The estimates for manufacturing firms are largely unaffected by the inclusion of R&D
intensity, which has an insignificantly negative coefficient in both specifications. This is in
line with the hypothesis that the variable costs of income reallocation by manufacturing
firms are low, and that manufacturing firms therefore strongly respond to taxation in
their decision to invest in tax havens.
For service firms, the estimated effect is positive with a P-value of 13.3% and 19.4%.
The most notable change in the other coefficients is that the average foreign non-haven tax
rate becomes negative and insignificant in the IV regressions if R&D intensity is included.
This corresponds to our finding for the fixed effects instrumental variables regressions.
Taken together, these observations are evidence in favor of the interpretation that the
baseline results point to the marginal costs of income reallocation being higher for service
firms, which consequently do not strongly react to taxation in their choice of tax haven
investment.
7.4. Potential endogeneity of foreign non-haven size
A comparison of equations (10) and (14) shows that investing in a tax haven renders
investing at other foreign non-haven locations more attractive for a multinational firm,
23We also included an interaction term of R&D and the tax rate. As both R&D and the interaction term
usually turned out insignificant however, we do not report these results here. The results are available
from the authors upon request.
24639 manufacturing firms and 322 service firms are dropped for this reason.
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Table 4: Regressions including sector R&D intensity
Manufacturing Services
1 2 3 4
OLS IV OLS IV
Average foreign nh. 0.007∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ -0.053
tax rate (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.065)
Parent size -0.060∗∗ -0.057∗∗ 0.014 0.013
(0.022) (0.023) (0.015) (0.015)
Parent size, squared 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.002 0.003∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Non-haven size -0.051∗∗ -0.038 -0.076∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗
(0.021) (0.025) (0.022) (0.048)
Non-haven size, 0.011∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
squared (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
Sector R&D intensity -0.001 -0.007 0.009 0.027
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.021)
Constant -0.026 -0.755∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗ 1.544
(0.077) (0.291) (0.050) (1.805)
# of observations 9915 9915 3860 3860
# of sectoral groups 23 23 14 14
R-squared 0.17 0.04 0.16 –
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y
Instrument N Y N Y
F-Statistics – 11.88∗∗∗ – 4.78∗
Standard errors Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the
parent firm.
Note: The coefficient of the sector R&D intensity has a P-value of 13.3% in column 3 and of 19.4% in column 4.
Dependent variable: dummy variable which denotes whether a parent owns at least one affiliate in at least one tax
haven in a given year. Independent variables: see Table 2; sector R&D intensity: calculated as expenditures on
innovation over total sales by sector.
because it can thereby enlarge its base of income available to reallocate. Therefore, not
only the average foreign non-haven tax rate, but also non-haven size, may be endogenous.
To address this issue, we use an instrumentation strategy that abstracts from changes in
non-haven locations. We use this idea both to take endogeneity of the non-haven size into
account and to conduct a robustness check of our previous instrumentation strategy.
We focus our analysis on the years 2002 and 2008.25 We restrict our regression sample
to firms that changed their tax haven use between 2002 and 2008. Thus, our strategy
mimics fixed effects logit, where the coefficients are identified given that the dependent
variable has changed. We define a new dependent variable that takes the value zero if a
firm holds a tax haven affiliate in 2002 and does not in 2008, and the value one if a firm
25Note that considerable fraction of variation is lost in this manner, because firms exit before 2008 or
enter after 2002, or because they revise their decision to invest in a tax haven more than once during our
period of analysis.
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does not have a tax haven affiliate in 2002 and does so in 2008:
∆i =
0 if yi2002 = 1 and yi2008 = 01 if yi2002 = 0 and yi2008 = 1 (29)
About 60% of firms start using a tax haven, around 40% of firms close down their tax
haven activities. As independent variables, we use changes in parent size, the size of
non-haven activities and the average foreign non-haven tax rate. This way, we partial out
the firm fixed effect.
To construct the instrument, we focus on affiliates that a multinational holds in both
2002 and 2008, because tax rate changes at these locations are exogenous to any locational
changes that a firm has made after opening an affiliate in a tax haven or closing down its
haven activities. To take the endogeneity of the foreign non-haven size into account, we
use the insight that affiliate growth can be very well explained by GDP growth with a
coefficient that is not significantly different from one (Desai et al., 2006). We inflate the
size of the foreign non-haven affiliates in 2002 by GDP growth between 2002 and 2008
and use the resulting hypothetical change in the foreign non-haven size as an instrument
for the actual change in foreign non-haven size between 2008 and 2002. Only actual non-
haven size includes affiliates which may have been opened or closed due to the decision
to invest or stop investing in a tax haven. Note that we can only include size linearly in
our regression because our strategy yields only one instrument.
We instrument the difference of the average foreign non-haven tax rates with the
difference of tax rates had a firm refrained from adjustments in its location choices. The
idea of this alternative instrument is to capture changes in the firm’s average tax rate
that are exogenous to the firm and do not depend on changes in tax haven use.
We calculate the sum of the differences of the tax rates interacted with GDP at the
locations where a firm is present in both 2002 and 2008 and weight the single differences
with the difference in GDP:
Tit =
∑L
l=1(τl,2008 ·GDPl,2008 − τl,2002 ·GDPl,2002)∑L
l=1(GDPl,2008 −GDPl,2002)
, (30)
where l = 1, ..., L are the locations of a firm in both 2002 and 2008.
Table 5 presents the estimation results, which, for manufacturing firms, are largely
consistent with estimated tax effects obtained earlier using different identification methods
and much larger samples. In the specification that instruments only for the average foreign
non-haven tax rate, the 0.052 coefficient indicates that firms whose average foreign non-
haven tax rates increase are more likely than others to add a tax haven affiliate. This
effect is significant at the 5.9% level in a two-tailed test, implying that it is possible to
reject (using a one-tailed test) that high non-haven foreign tax rates discourage tax haven
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Table 5: Regression results, alternative instrumentation strategy
Manufacturing firms Service firms
1 2 3 4
∆ ave. foreign 0.052∗ 0.048 0.052 0.056
n.h. tax rate (0.027) (0.036) (0.030) (0.030)
∆ parent size 0.120∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.134 0.134
(0.041) (0.041) (0.143) (0.134)
∆ non-haven size 0.153∗∗ 0.181 0.128∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗
(0.069) (0.128) (0.044) (0.101)
Constant 0.704∗∗∗ 0.683∗∗∗ 0.731∗∗∗ 0.686∗∗∗
(0.123) (0.170) (0.162) (0.189)
# of parents 88 88 32 32
R-squared 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.18
Endogenous variable Tax Tax & Size Tax Tax & Size
F-statistics (tax) 27.35∗∗∗ 32.86∗∗∗ 27.24∗∗∗ 14.77∗∗∗
F-statistics (size) – 42.80∗∗∗ – 2.56∗
Partial R-squared (tax) – 0.16 – 0.45
Partial R-squared (size) – 0.12 – 0.17
Standard errors Robust Robust Robust Robust
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Note: the significance level of the coefficient of non-haven size is 15.6% in column 2. The coefficient of the average
foreign non-haven tax rate has a P-value of 18.7% in column 2 and 24.7% in column 4. Dependent variable: dummy
variable; 1 if a parent firm did not hold an affiliate in a tax haven in 2002, but does so in 2008, zero if it did hold a tax
haven affiliate in 2002 and does not so in 2008. Independent variables: differences in the average foreign non-haven
tax rate, the number of parent employees and the number of non-haven employees between 2002 and 2008.
affiliate ownership, as reported by Desai et al. (2006) for U.S. firms. If both non-haven size
and taxation are instrumented, the resulting coefficients are of similar magnitude but lower
significance levels, reflecting in part the small sample size. Firms with growing parent
companies are more likely than others to add tax haven affiliates, which is consistent with
earlier findings.
It is difficult to draw ambitious inferences about the behavior of service firms from
the regressions reported in columns 3-4, largely due to the problem of using instrumental
variables methods with a small (32 firms) sample, though greater size of non-haven foreign
operations is associated with adding tax haven operations, which is again consistent with
patterns appearing in other regressions.
7.5. Imputation of missing values of size variable
Almost a fifth of observations on parent firms in services drop from the regression
sample because the number of parent or non-haven employees is zero, so size is not
defined. The regression results for service firms may consequently reflect this aspect of
sample selection, and possibly produce estimates of behavioral parameters that are not
representative of the entire sample.
The reason for observed zero employees is not clear. We exclude the sector holding
companies and housing and real estate where such a figure may (and does frequently)
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occur. Zero observed sales are a result of the reporting requirements. Sales are surveyed
in million euros, so they are zero for any firm with a turnover of strictly less than 500,000
euros. This implies that a reported figure x disguises possible true sales values ranging
from 1, 000, 000x − 500, 000 to 1, 000, 000x + 500, 000, except for 0 which disguises the
interval [0; 499, 999].
We exploit this insight to impute the sales variables in order to use all the observa-
tions. Imputation does not recreate the true values of sales, but it enables us to handle
the missing values in a way that results in valid statistical inferences. We use a model
for grouped data developed in the statistical literature by Heitjan and Rubin (1990), im-
puting parent and non-haven sales based on the assumption that sales are log-normally
distributed. This assumption is reasonable given the distribution of observed sales in our
data. Conditional on the other covariates we impute 120 sets of potential true values
that are in accord with reported observations.26 We re-run our analyses and re-calculate
coefficients and standard errors based on the formulas developed by Rubin (1987) which
take into account that our data are imputed.
Instead of this rather complex procedure, one could opt for a more pragmatic solution
such as plugging in “1” in place of the zeros. One could argue that “1” is close to
zero relative to the other values observed, so measurement error should be negligible,
but nonetheless, all observations could be used in the analysis. We prefer imputation
because plugging in “1” would create an artificial censoring value. According to a recent
literature started by Rigobon and Stoker (2007, 2009), this could introduce further bias in
our analysis because previously missing observations then pile up at ln(1). For the same
reason, plugging in any other value below 500,000 instead of the zeros is not a viable
option. Further, the imputation procedure takes into account the correlation between
the sales variables and the other variables employed in our analysis, so it deals with the
missing data in a statistically appropriate way.
Table C.26 in Appendix C provides the estimated coefficients for regressions using data
on service firms. The use of imputed data does not appear to produce major changes in
the coefficient and significance patterns. In particular, higher average non-haven foreign
tax rates continue to be associated with greater likelihood of tax haven affiliate ownership
in the uninstrumented regressions and with no effect on tax haven affiliate ownership
in the instrumented regressions. There are small differences in the estimated effects of
parent size on tax haven affiliate ownership, but these are largely unimportant, so this
evidence suggests that the difference in the effect of taxes on tax haven investment between
manufacturing and service firms is unlikely to be attributable to sample selection among
service firms.
26The imputation procedure is described in detail in Appendix B.
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8. Discussion
Table 6 lists the effect of an increase of the independent variables by one standard
deviation according to our estimates, expressed relative to the standard deviation of the
dependent variable. The upper panel is calculated based on the estimates involving em-
ployees and the lower panel is based on the estimates involving sales as size measure.
Table 6: Economic significance
Manufacturing firms Service firms
IV FE IV IV FEIV
Ave. foreign n.h. tax rate 0.41 0.58 0.46 −0.73
Parent employees 0.27 0.15 0.10 −0.02
Foreign non-haven employees 0.56 0.27 0.40 0.47
Ave. foreign n.h. tax rate 0.47 0.56 0.68 −0.93
Parent sales 0.08 -0.06 0.20 0.04
Foreign non-haven sales 0.90 0.25 0.21 0.58
The table contains the effect of an increase in one of the independent variables by one standard deviation at the mean
of all independent variables on the probability of tax haven investment, expressed in standard deviations.
Statistically significant effects are printed in bold.
The left part of the table shows the implied effects for manufacturing firms and the
right part for service firms. The differences in the estimated coefficients outlined above
translate to substantive differences in the implied economic effects of changes in the inde-
pendent variables. For manufacturing firms, the implied effect of a change in the tax rate
is sizeable. Throughout the specifications, an increase in the average foreign non-haven
tax rate at the mean is estimated to cause an increase in the probability to invest in a
tax haven by 0.4 to 0.6 standard deviations. The effect is stable if fixed effects are used,
that is, it is not driven by unobservable differences in the cost of income reallocation. In
contrast, the implied effect of an increase in non-haven size is two to three times as high in
the pooled IV estimates as in the fixed effects IV specifications, which suggests that this
variable takes up unobserved firm-specific characteristics. Parent size plays a subordinate
role.
For service firms, there is a clear difference between the estimates with and without
fixed effects. Given the pooled IV specifications, changes in the average foreign non-haven
tax rate should positively influence tax haven investment. The fixed effects IV estimates
imply on the contrary that taxation is the most important impediment, though these
coefficients are not statistically different from zero. It appears likely that the estimates of
tax effects in the pooled specification reflect the impact of omitted firm-specific character-
istics. Our findings are consistent with either high marginal costs of income reallocation
by service firms, or - compared to manufacturing firms - relatively little variability in
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the cost of income reallocation, either of which would be consistent with small effects of
foreign tax rates on tax haven investment.
9. Conclusion
This paper analyzes factors that influence tax haven investment and test these using
data on firms subject to a tax exemption system. The estimates control for firm fixed
effects and separately analyze tax haven investments of manufacturing and service firms.
The model implies that high foreign tax rates encourage tax haven investment, but that
this effect is dampened by firm-specific marginal costs of income reallocation. Further,
the model indicates that the relationship between non-haven taxation and the incentive to
invest in a tax haven is complex and composed of two opposite effects. Higher tax rates at
the locations where a firm is already present before investing in a tax haven increase the
probability of investing in a tax haven, as expected. In contrast, the opposite relationship
holds for tax rates at locations that become attractive investment venues only for firms
that also have tax haven investments: the attractiveness of tax havens increases as tax
rates fall in these potential investment locations. This mechanism may in part explain
the persistence of tax haven investment despite falling tax rates elsewhere.
There appear to be significant differences between the tax haven investment patterns
of service and manufacturing firms. High foreign tax rates are associated with tax haven
investments of manufacturing firms, which is consistent with tax havens being used to re-
allocate taxable income from jurisdictions in which it is taxed more heavily. At the mean,
an increase in the average foreign non-haven tax rate of one percentage point increases the
probability that a manufacturing firm invests in a tax haven by three percentage points.
This effect is robust to controlling for unobservable firm-specific differences. Tax haven
investment by service firms is not significantly influenced by taxation if unobservable firm-
specific characteristics are taken into account. This evidence is consistent with service
firms facing high marginal costs of income reallocation, and relatively little variability
in these costs, which together depress the effects of foreign tax rate differences. Still,
tax haven investment is relatively more common among service firms than among manu-
facturing firms, reflecting the attractiveness of tax haven locations for ordinary business
activities in service industries. This suggests that policy measures that raise the cost of
income reallocation may discourage tax haven investment. At the same time, such policy
measures may encourage firms to shift real activities to tax havens.
Given the increasing share of service industries in Western economies, the tax avoid-
ance activities of service firms, and their consequences, offers a fruitful area for further
research.
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Appendix A. List of countries classified as tax havens
The following countries are classified as tax havens according to Hines and Rice (1994,
p. 178):
Andorra, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda,
British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Channel Islands, Cook Island, Cyprus, Dominica,
Gibraltar, Grenada, Hong Kong, Ireland, Isle of Man, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Liecht-
enstein, Luxembourg, Macao, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Montserrat,
Netherlands Antilles, Panama, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Martin, Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines, Singapore, Switzerland, Turks and Caicos Islands, Vanuatu.
We are unable to distinguish investment in Monaco and Saint Martin from investment
in France. Therefore, these tax havens are neglected in our analysis.
The OECD’s list of tax havens contains the following countries (OECD, 2000): An-
dorra, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize,
British Virgin Islands, Cook Islands, Dominica, Gibraltar, Grenada, Guernsey/ Sark/
Alderney, Isle of Man, Jersey, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Monaco,
Montserrat, Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, Niue, Panama, Samoa, Seychelles, St Lucia, St.
Christopher and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Tonga, Turks & Caicos, US
Virgin Islands, Vanuatu.
Appendix B. Imputation procedure
The imputation procedure basically consists of two steps. First, we estimate the
relationship of the natural log of parent sales and the natural log of non-haven sales
and the other variables employed in our analysis using the EM-algorithm proposed by
Hasselblad, Stead, and Galke (1980). Then, we follow Heitjan and Rubin (1990) and
impute plausible values for parent sales and non-haven sales given the other variables as
well as the coefficients derived in the first step and based on the assumption of a normally
distributed error term. We generate 120 sets of plausible data, as Heitjan and Rubin
(1990) use a similar number of imputations in their study.
Tables C.24 and C.25 provide summary statistics on several sets of imputed sales
compared to the observed parent and non-haven sales. The left parts of the tables show
statistics for all parent-years, that is, including those units with missing observed sales. As
expected, the mean of the imputed sales are lower and the standard deviation is higher.
The right part of the table shows the statistics only for those units with non-missing
observed parent and non-haven sales. The moments of the distributions of the imputed
data sets are very close to the corresponding moments of the observed data. We are thus
assured of not introducing some artificial correlation or bias into our analysis through our
imputation procedure.
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Table C.9: Correlation of average foreign non-haven tax rate given different weighting schemes
Manufacturing Service
Weighting by GDP GDP
Observed profits, positive 0.8286 0.8641
N 8952 4665
Fixed and intangible assets 0.8482 0.8948
N 10,849 5800
Number of employees 0.8480 0.9175
N 10,779 5670
Sales 0.8931 0.9347
N 10,777 5704
All correlations are significant with a P-value of 0.00%.
Table C.10: Distribution of observations by sector
Manufacturing Service
Sector Parent-years Parents Sector Parent-years Parents
1500 589 114 5000 159 33
1600 26 6 5100 2933 700
1700 318 69 5200 420 86
1800 187 42 5500 56 10
1900 75 16 6000 299 76
2000 87 18 6100 137 34
2100 227 50 6200 22 4
2200 281 58 6300 246 58
2300 55 12 6400 97 26
2400 1097 241 7100 193 41
2500 912 191 7200 393 105
2600 446 98 7300 77 15
2700 451 97 7400 1465 437
2800 1098 235 8000 14 4
2900 2503 529 8500 36 6
3000 82 21 9000 51 15
3100 799 178 9200 125 33
3200 332 74 9300 10 4
3300 922 195
3400 708 139
3500 142 31
3600 242 51
3700 24 8
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Table C.11: Regression results, parent productivity 2004-2008, manufacturing firms
OLS IV FE FEIV
Ave. foreign 0.008∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.059
n.h. tax rate (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (1.262)
Parent 0.011 0.020∗∗ -0.011 0.001
productivity (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.137)
Foreign non- -0.077∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗ -0.036
haven size (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.786)
Foreign n.h. size, 0.015∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.005
squared (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.132)
Constant -0.175∗∗∗ -0.815∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ -1.510
(0.068) (0.251) (0.057) (37.407)
# of observations 7538 7538 7538 7538
# of parents 2019 2019 2019 2019
R-squared 0.15 0.05 0.02 –
Instrument N Y N Y
F-Statistics – 37.60∗∗∗ – 3.87∗∗
Standard errors Cluster Cluster Cluster Bootstrap
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications contain year dummies.
Table C.12: Regression results, parent productivity 2004-2008, service firms
OLS IV FE FEIV
Ave. foreign 0.007∗∗∗ 0.025 -0.000 -0.023
n.h. tax rate (0.002) (0.022) (0.001) (0.228)
Parent 0.008 0.010 0.017∗ 0.019
productivity (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.072)
Foreign non- -0.068∗∗ -0.053 -0.035 -0.043
haven size (0.027) (0.034) (0.022) (0.038)
Foreign n.h. size, 0.013∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.009
squared (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.011)
Constant -0.113 -0.585 0.027 0.630
(0.100) (0.669) (0.079) (5.495)
# of observations 3413 3410 3413 3410
# of parents 998 998 998 998
R-squared 0.09 0.01 0.02 –
Instrument N Y N Y
F-Statistics – 4.78∗∗ – 6.78∗∗∗
Standard errors Cluster Cluster Cluster Bootstrap
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications contain year dummies.
Note: in column 2, the coefficient of linear non-haven size has a P-value of 11.8%.
Note: the number of observations in the regressions with productivity is lower than the number of observations in the
regressions with parent size because we restrict our sample to the years 2004-2008 in the former case. This explains
why the coefficients are insignificant in the fixed effects framework: too much variation over time is deleted.
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Table C.13: Regression results, parent productivity 2002-2008, manufacturing firms
OLS IV FE FEIV
Ave. foreign non-haven 0.0082∗∗∗ 0.0307∗∗∗ 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0383
tax rate (0.0009) (0.0076) (0.0009) (0.0236)
Parent productivity 0.0093 0.0183∗∗ -0.0126∗ -0.0101
(0.0079) (0.0090) (0.0068) (0.0072)
Foreign non-haven -0.0782∗∗∗ -0.0592∗∗∗ -0.0511∗∗∗ -0.0360
size (0.0127) (0.0148) (0.0144) (0.0241)
Foreign non-haven 0.0152∗∗∗ 0.0135∗∗∗ 0.0089∗∗∗ 0.0063∗
size, squared (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0036)
Constant -0.1514∗∗ -0.8911∗∗∗ 0.1566∗∗∗ -0.8896
(0.0630) (0.2641) (0.0475) (0.6946)
# of observations 10568 10568 10568 10568
# of parents 2288 2288 2288 2288
R-squared 0.15 0.05 0.02 –
Instrument N Y N Y
F-Statistics – 37.28∗∗∗ – 6.95∗∗∗
Standard errors Cluster Cluster Cluster Bootstrap
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications contain year dummies.
Note: the P-value of the coefficient of the average foreign non-haven tax rate in the FE IV regression is 10.5%.
Table C.14: Regression results, parent productivity 2002-2008, service firms
OLS IV FE FEIV
Ave. foreign non-haven 0.0077∗∗∗ 0.0304 0.0000 -0.0436
tax rate (0.0015) (0.0226) (0.0013) (0.0787)
Parent productivity 0.0058 0.0087 0.0120 0.0132
(0.0073) (0.0081) (0.0083) (0.0125)
Foreign non-haven -0.0667∗∗∗ -0.0484 -0.0364∗ -0.0453
size (0.0250) (0.0312) (0.0221) (0.0484)
Foreign non-haven 0.0127∗∗∗ 0.0110∗∗∗ 0.0088∗∗∗ 0.0111
size, squared (0.0030) (0.0034) (0.0032) (0.0079)
Constant -0.1346 -0.7463 0.0403 1.2152
(0.0930) (0.6802) (0.0795) (2.1456)
# of observations 4788 4783 4788 4783
# of parents 1198 1197 1198 1197
R-squared 0.09 – 0.03 –
Instrument N Y N Y
F-Statistics – 5.13∗∗ – 3.49∗
Standard errors Cluster Cluster Cluster Bootstrap
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications contain year dummies.
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Table C.15: Regression results, manufacturing firms, sales as size measure
OLS IV FE FEIV
Average foreign non-haven 0.004∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗
tax rate (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.019)
Ln (parent sales) 0.026 -0.006 0.043 0.032
0.039) (0.043) (0.037) (0.041)
Ln (parent sales), squared -0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Ln (non-haven sales) -0.234∗∗∗ -0.255∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.076
(0.038) (0.041) (0.040) (0.051)
Ln (non-haven sales), 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.004
squared (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Constant 0.629∗∗∗ 0.205 0.208 -0.794
(0.239) (0.284) (0.240) (0.596)
# of observations 10614 10614 10614 10614
# of parents 2297 2297 2297 2297
R-squared 0.17 0.02 0.01 –
Instrument N Y N Y
F-Statistics – 38.89∗∗∗ – 7.47∗∗∗
Standard errors Cluster Cluster Cluster Bootstrap
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications contain year dummies.
Note: Non-haven sales are significant at 13.3% (linear term) and 12.3% (squared term) in column 4.
Table C.16: Regression results, service firms, sales as size measure
OLS IV FE FEIV
Average foreign non-haven 0.005∗∗∗ 0.042∗ 0.000 -0.058
tax rate (0.001) (0.022) (0.001) (2.944)
Ln (parent sales) -0.047 -0.063 -0.050 0.033
(0.047) (0.052) (0.050) (3.663)
Ln (parent sales), squared 0.003 0.004 0.003 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.175)
Ln (non-haven sales) -0.114∗∗ -0.064 -0.160∗∗∗ -0.207
(0.056) (0.066) (0.055) (3.997)
Ln (non-haven sales), 0.008∗∗ 0.004 0.010∗∗∗ 0.014
squared (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.258)
Constant 0.474 -0.609 0.911∗∗ 2.150
(0.312) (0.743) (0.372) (75.897)
# of observations 5053 5048 5053 5048
# of parents 1275 1274 1275 1274
R-squared 0.11 – 0.03 –
Instrument N Y N Y
F-Statistics – 6.37∗∗ – 2.89∗
Standard errors Cluster Cluster Cluster Bootstrap
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications contain year dummies.
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Table C.17: Limited dependent variable models, manufacturing firms
Probit IV probit Logit FE logit
Average foreign non-haven 0.045∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗
tax rate (0.007) (0.027) (0.014) (0.072)
Parent size -0.198∗ -0.142 -0.327 0.201
(0.105) (0.092) (0.214) (1.384)
Parent size, squared 0.029∗∗∗ 0.017∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.073
(0.010) (0.009) (0.019) (0.144)
Non-haven size -0.077 -0.015 0.003 -2.001∗∗
(0.079) (0.073) (0.168) (0.994)
Non-haven size, squared 0.030∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.017) (0.104)
Constant -2.766∗∗∗ -5.564∗∗∗ -5.555∗∗∗ –
(0.409) (0.733) (0.847) –
Observations 10661 10661 10661 920
Standard errors Cluster Cluster Cluster Bootstrap
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications contain year dummies.
Table C.18: Limited dependent variable models, service firms
Probit IV probit Logit FE logit
Average foreign non-haven 0.042∗∗∗ 0.128∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.050
tax rate (0.009) (0.066) (0.018) (0.116)
Parent size 0.240∗∗ 0.206∗∗ 0.503∗∗ 0.200
(0.097) (0.101) (0.216) (1.555)
Parent size, squared -0.012 -0.012 -0.028 -0.004
(0.010) (0.009) (0.021) (0.149)
Non-haven size -0.198∗ -0.108 -0.333 -1.099
(0.107) (0.133) (0.225) (1.068)
Non-haven size, squared 0.037∗∗∗ 0.028∗ 0.064∗∗ 0.234∗
(0.012) (0.016) (0.025) (0.128)
Constant -3.026∗∗∗ -5.248∗∗∗ -5.671∗∗∗ –
(0.402) (1.537) (0.845) –
Observations 5052 5047 5052 447
Standard errors Cluster Cluster Cluster Bootstrap
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications contain year dummies.
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Table C.19: Regression results including data on holding companies, manufacturing firms
OLS IV FE FEIV
Average foreign non-haven 0.008∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗
tax rate (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.017)
Parent size -0.029∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗ -0.008 -0.006
(0.010) (0.010) (0.017) (0.017)
Parent size, squared 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Non-haven size -0.051∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ -0.033∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.019)
Non-haven size, squared 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Constant -0.118∗∗∗ -0.499∗∗ 0.082∗ -0.877∗
(0.039) (0.219) (0.047) (0.494)
# of observations 13611 13611 13611 13611
# of parents 3035 3035 3035 3035
R-squared 0.14 0.11 0.02 –
Instrument N Y N Y
F-Statistics – 61.96∗∗∗ – 19.07∗∗∗
Standard errors Cluster Cluster Cluster Bootstrap
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications contain year dummies.
Table C.20: Regression results including data on holding companies, service firms
OLS IV FE FEIV
Average foreign non-haven 0.010∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.000 -0.014
tax rate (0.001) (0.019) (0.001) (0.031)
Parent size 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.004
(0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016)
Parent size, squared 0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Non-haven size -0.044∗∗∗ -0.028 -0.008 -0.007
(0.016) (0.020) (0.019) (0.021)
Non-haven size, squared 0.010∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.004∗ 0.005∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant -0.195∗∗∗ -1.076∗∗ 0.120∗∗ 0.489
(0.053) (0.545) (0.060) (0.841)
# of observations 6848 6843 6848 6843
# of parents 1711 1711 1711 1711
R-squared 0.14 – 0.01 –
Instrument N Y N Y
F-Statistics – 9.85∗∗∗ – 7.47∗∗∗
Standard errors Cluster Cluster Cluster Bootstrap
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications contain year dummies.
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Table C.21: Dropping affiliates in Switzerland, manufacturing firms
OLS 2SLS FE FE IV
Average foreign non-haven 0.005∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.046∗
tax rate (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.027)
Parent size -0.058∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ -0.010 -0.004
(0.016) (0.016) (0.024) (0.027)
Parent size, squared 0.007∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.003 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Foreign non-haven size -0.075∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.023
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.024)
Foreign non-haven size, 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.004
squared (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Constant 0.081∗ -0.432∗∗ 0.006 -1.251
(0.045) (0.162) (0.061) (0.771)
# of observations 10661 10661 10661 10661
# of parents 2320 2320 2320 2320
R-squared 0.19 0.09 0.02 –
Instrument N Y N Y
F-statistics instrument – 40.95∗∗∗ – 6.53∗∗
Standard errors Cluster Cluster Cluster Bootstrap
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications contain year dummies.
Note: ownership of a tax haven affiliate is observed in 7.9% of firms-years in the regression sample.
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Table C.22: Dropping affiliates in Switzerland, service firms
OLS 2SLS FE FE IV
Average foreign non-haven 0.005∗∗∗ 0.018 0.000 -0.012
tax rate (0.001) (0.013) (0.001) (0.058)
Parent size 0.004 0.003 -0.006 -0.004
(0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010)
Parent size, squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Foreign non-haven size -0.067∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗ -0.036∗ -0.040
(0.020) (0.022) (0.018) (0.033)
Foreign non-haven size, 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.009
squared (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007)
Constant -0.053 -0.421 0.067 0.409
(0.054) (0.361) (0.034) (1.570)
# of observations 5052 5047 5052 5047
# of parents 1270 1269 1270 1269
R-squared 0.11 0.03 0.03 –
Instrument N Y N Y
F-statistics instrument – 5.76∗∗ – 3.36∗
Standard errors Cluster Cluster Cluster Bootstrap
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications contain year dummies.
Note: ownership of a tax haven affiliate is observed in 6.6% of firms-years in the regression sample.
Table C.23: Regressions using tax rates from Djankov et al. (2010)
Manufacturing Services
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Average foreign non-haven 0.004∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.011
tax rate (0.001) (0.007) (0.002) (0.011)
Parent size -0.078∗∗ -0.076∗∗ 0.027 0.028
(0.030) (0.031) (0.019) (0.019)
Parent size, squared 0.009∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Foreign non-haven size -0.072∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ -0.033 -0.023
(0.020) (0.021) (0.033) (0.040)
Foreign non-haven size, 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.007∗ 0.006
squared (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 0.179∗∗ -0.090 -0.125 -0.233
(0.087) (0.166) (0.084) (0.274)
# of observations 1482 1482 686 685
# of parents 1482 1482 686 685
Instrument N Y N Y
Standard errors Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications contain year dummies.
50
T
ab
le
C
.2
4:
C
om
p
ar
is
on
:
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
on
o
f
o
b
se
rv
ed
p
a
re
n
t
sa
le
s
a
n
d
n
in
e
ex
a
m
p
le
se
ts
o
f
im
p
u
te
d
p
a
re
n
t
sa
le
s
A
ll
p
ar
en
t-
ye
ar
s
O
n
ly
n
on
-z
er
o
ob
se
rv
ed
sa
le
s
N
M
ea
n
S
D
S
ke
w
.
K
u
rt
.
N
M
ea
n
S
D
S
ke
w
.
K
u
rt
.
L
n
(p
ar
en
t
sa
le
s)
,
ob
se
rv
ed
16
97
8
18
.2
40
1.
68
8
.1
11
3.
87
7
16
97
8
18
.2
40
1.
68
8
.1
11
3.
87
7
L
n
(p
ar
en
t
sa
le
s)
,
im
p
u
te
d
18
04
8
17
.8
96
2.
13
8
-.
67
9
4.
23
9
16
97
8
18
.2
38
1.
69
2
.0
90
3.
92
2
L
n
(p
ar
en
t
sa
le
s)
,
im
p
u
te
d
18
04
8
17
.8
96
2.
14
0
-.
68
4
4.
25
2
16
97
8
18
.2
39
1.
69
1
.0
95
3.
91
4
L
n
(p
ar
en
t
sa
le
s)
,
im
p
u
te
d
18
04
8
17
.8
97
2.
13
7
-.
67
6
4.
23
0
16
97
8
18
.2
38
1.
69
2
.0
91
3.
92
0
L
n
(p
ar
en
t
sa
le
s)
,
im
p
u
te
d
18
04
8
17
.8
99
2.
13
2
-.
66
9
4.
22
5
16
97
8
18
.2
39
1.
69
0
.1
00
3.
90
8
L
n
(p
ar
en
t
sa
le
s)
,
im
p
u
te
d
18
04
8
17
.8
96
2.
13
9
-.
68
2
4.
24
4
16
97
8
18
.2
38
1.
69
2
.0
91
3.
92
4
L
n
(p
ar
en
t
sa
le
s)
,
im
p
u
te
d
18
04
8
17
.8
99
2.
13
3
-.
66
8
4.
21
6
16
97
8
18
.2
39
1.
69
0
.0
98
3.
90
8
L
n
(p
ar
en
t
sa
le
s)
,
im
p
u
te
d
18
04
8
17
.8
97
2.
13
8
-.
67
8
4.
24
0
16
97
8
18
.2
38
1.
69
3
.0
89
3.
92
4
L
n
(p
ar
en
t
sa
le
s)
,
im
p
u
te
d
18
04
8
17
.8
98
2.
13
5
-.
67
4
4.
22
7
16
97
8
18
.2
39
1.
69
0
.0
10
3.
90
6
L
n
(p
ar
en
t
sa
le
s)
,
im
p
u
te
d
18
04
8
17
.8
95
2.
14
3
-.
69
0
4.
26
5
16
97
8
18
.2
38
1.
69
2
.0
90
3.
92
4
T
ab
le
C
.2
5:
C
om
p
ar
is
on
:
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
on
o
f
o
b
se
rv
ed
n
o
n
-h
av
en
sa
le
s
a
n
d
n
in
e
ex
a
m
p
le
se
ts
of
im
p
u
te
d
p
a
re
n
t
sa
le
s
A
ll
p
ar
en
t-
ye
ar
s
O
n
ly
n
on
-z
er
o
ob
se
rv
ed
sa
le
s
N
M
ea
n
S
D
S
ke
w
.
K
u
rt
.
N
M
ea
n
S
D
S
ke
w
.
K
u
rt
.
L
n
(n
on
-h
av
en
sa
le
s)
,
ob
se
rv
ed
17
20
1
16
.8
58
1.
58
9
.4
58
3.
67
0
17
20
1
16
.8
58
1.
58
9
.4
58
3.
67
0
L
n
(n
on
-h
av
en
sa
le
s)
,
im
p
u
te
d
18
04
8
16
.6
55
1.
80
9
-.
06
2
3.
76
7
17
20
1
16
.8
59
1.
59
0
.4
43
3.
71
4
L
n
(n
on
-h
av
en
sa
le
s)
,
im
p
u
te
d
18
04
8
16
.6
57
1.
80
3
-.
04
2
3.
73
6
17
20
1
16
.8
60
1.
58
7
.4
56
3.
68
8
L
n
(n
on
-h
av
en
sa
le
s)
,
im
p
u
te
d
18
04
8
16
.6
57
1.
80
3
-.
04
0
3.
72
0
17
20
1
16
.8
60
1.
58
8
.4
56
3.
68
0
L
n
(n
on
-h
av
en
sa
le
s)
,
im
p
u
te
d
18
04
8
16
.6
58
1.
80
1
-.
03
5
3.
70
8
17
20
1
16
.8
59
1.
59
1
.4
43
3.
70
2
L
n
(n
on
-h
av
en
sa
le
s)
,
im
p
u
te
d
18
04
8
16
.6
57
1.
80
4
-.
04
5
3.
72
6
17
20
1
16
.8
60
1.
58
9
.4
46
3.
70
8
L
n
(n
on
-h
av
en
sa
le
s)
,
im
p
u
te
d
18
04
8
16
.6
57
1.
80
1
-.
03
4
3.
70
6
17
20
1
16
.8
58
1.
59
1
.4
39
3.
71
7
L
n
(n
on
-h
av
en
sa
le
s)
,
im
p
u
te
d
18
04
8
16
.6
58
1.
80
2
-.
04
0
3.
72
6
17
20
1
16
.8
61
1.
58
6
.4
63
3.
67
5
L
n
(n
on
-h
av
en
sa
le
s)
,
im
p
u
te
d
18
04
8
16
.6
57
1.
80
2
-.
03
5
3.
69
9
17
20
1
16
.8
59
1.
59
0
.4
47
3.
69
6
L
n
(n
on
-h
av
en
sa
le
s)
,
im
p
u
te
d
18
04
8
16
.6
58
1.
80
1
-.
03
6
3.
71
7
17
20
1
16
.8
60
1.
58
9
.4
46
3.
70
7
51
Table C.26: Regressions based on imputed data, service firms
OLS IV FE FE IV
Average foreign non-haven 0.005∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.029
tax rate (0.001) (0.001) (0.015) (0.208)
Ln (parent sales) -0.065∗ -0.064∗∗ -0.024 -0.016
(0.034) (0.025) (0.036) (0.043)
Ln (parent sales), squared 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Ln (non-haven sales) -0.176∗∗∗ -0.090∗ -0.172∗∗ -0.217
(0.055) (0.055) (0.072) (0.033)
Ln (non-haven sales), 0.007∗∗∗ 0.004∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.008
squared (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.011)
Constant 1.536∗∗∗ 0.0757 1.414 2.4513
(0.144) (0.427) (0.866) (7.684)
# of observations 6140 6140 6140 6140
# of imputations 120 120 120 120
Instrument N Y N Y
Mean F-statistics — 12.03∗∗∗ — 10.30∗∗∗
Standard errors Cluster Cluster Cluster Bootstrap
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications contain year dummies.
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